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Impossibility Theorems without Collective
Rationality¤
1 Introduction
Arrow’s general impossibility theorem [2] demonstrated the incompatibility of ﬁve con-
ditions on collective choice rules: unrestricted domain, nondictatorship, the Pareto con-
dition, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and transitive rationality of social choice
function. The last condition requires the existence of a social preference ordering such
that, given a set of alternatives, the chosen elements are those which are best with re-
spect to that ordering. Since the publication of Arrow’s theorem, an extensive body
of literature has appeared seeking to circumvent the diﬃculty. This chapter focuses on
attempts to resolve the paradox by weakening the collective rationality requirement.
For our purpose, it is convenient to decompose Arrow’s collective rationality require-
ment into two parts:
(a) Rationality. There exists a social preference relation R such that the elements
chosen out of a set of available alternatives S are those which are best in S with respect
to R. (R will be referred to as a rationalization.)
(b) Transitivity and completeness of the rationalization.
The sensitivity of Arrow’s result to the speciﬁcation of the degree of rationality was
ﬁrst noticed by Sen [22]. He continued to impose rationality but relaxed the second com-
ponent to require only completeness and quasi-transitivity (that is, transitivity of strict
preference), and showed that this weakened collective rationality requirement is compat-
ible with the remainder of Arrow’s conditions. Gibbard [10] subsequently proved that
any society whose collective choice rule meets Sen’s conditions contains an oligarchy, a
¤First published in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.13, 1976, pp.361-379. Joint paper with D. H.
Blair, G. Bordes and J. S. Kelly. Reprinted in Arrow, K. J. and G. Debreu, eds., The Foundations of
20th Century Economics, Vol.3, Landmark Papers in General Equilibrium Theory, Social Choice and
Welfare, Cheltenham, Glos: Edward Elgar, 2001, pp.660-678. This paper represents a consolidation of
overlapping work done independently by the four authors [3, 5, 13, 26]. The authors are indebted to
the referees of the Journal of Economic Theory, the Review of Economic Studies, and Econometrica
for seeing the possibility of such a consolidation. Thanks are also due to Donald J. Brown, John A.
Ferejohn, Robert P. Parks, and Amartya K. Sen.
1class of individuals who are jointly decisive for exclusion of an alternative from the social
choice out of a two-element set and each of whose members is individually decisive for
inclusion of an element in the choice from such a set. Any individual who by strictly
preferring x to y can ensure that y is not socially preferred to x is called a weak dictator;
every member of an oligarchy is clearly a weak dictator. Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein
[14] provided the ﬁrst published proof of Gibbard’s theorem and proved an alternative
impossibility result: even if weak dictators are to be countenanced, their multiplicity
causes quasi-transitive rational (and otherwise Arrovian) collective choice rules to vio-
late a decisiveness condition they call positive responsiveness. Thus, demanding merely
quasi-transitive rationality of social choice provides no satisfactory resolution of Arrow’s
antidemocratic result. Even the smallest nondictatorial oligarchy (of two) fails a require-
ment of responsiveness (which is admittedly quite strong) when there are more than
two voters; enlarging and “democratizing” the oligarchy aggregates the heterogeneity of
individual preferences into widespread social indiﬀerence rather than intransitivity.
Further weakening of the consistency requirement imposed by Arrow’s collective ra-
tionality (while continuing to insist on the existence of a rationalization) is entailed by
requiring acyclicity (nonexistence of a strict preference cycle) instead of quasi-transitivity
of the social preference relation. The importance of this substitution comes from the ob-
servation that acyclicity is necessary and suﬃcient to guarantee that society is able to
make a nonempty rational choice from any ﬁnite subset of the set of alternatives. In the
case of individuals with acyclic preferences choosing over an inﬁnite set of alternatives,
Brown [7] has shown that the only acyclic collective choice rules which satisfy the re-
mainder of Arrow’s conditions and are not oligarchic are those of what he calls collegial
polities. Under such a procedure, there exists a quasi-oligarchy, a subset of individuals
whose unanimous assent is a necessary condition for the exclusion of an alternative from
the social choice out of a two-element set. In contrast with the Gibbardian oligarchy,
consensus within the quasi-oligarchy, though necessary, is not suﬃcient for exclusion. For
this class of decision rules, at least one individual outside the quasi-oligarchy must also
prefer x to y to ensure a similar social preference. Thus, weakening Arrow’s transitive
rationality to require only acyclic rationality is a step in the democratic direction. The
complete asymmetry between the power of individuals within and outside the oligarchy is
diluted when quasi-transitivity is abandoned. Some non-quasi-oligarchs do have power:
they are pivotal to the success of some winning coalitions. Nevertheless the tradeoﬀs
remain between heterogeneity of preferences, decisiveness, and inequalities in the distri-
bution of power, as is shown by another Mas-Colell-Sonnenschein theorem which asserts
that no acyclic collective choice rules exist satisfying both their no-weak-dictators and
positive responsiveness conditions along with the remainder of Arrow’s conditions. This
proposition imposes no restrictions on the size of the alternatives set. In the case of
individuals with acyclic preferences choosing over a ﬁnite set, Brown [6] has obtained a
precise characterization of acyclic Arrovian collective choice rules which indicates clearly
how they violate the positive responsiveness requirement. Collegial polities are of course
acyclic even on a ﬁnite set, and nontrivial ones are obviously unresponsive to changes
in the preferences of some voters. The only anonymous acyclic procedures in the ﬁnite
2case, as Brown shows, are rules satisfying the following condition: if M is the number of
alternatives, every M-tuple of decisive coalitions of individuals must have nonempty inter-
section. This class of procedures includes simple special-majority rules (e.g., 2
3 majority)
and representative systems with a special-majority rule at each stage. For alternative
sets which are large relative to the size of the set of individuals, these procedures are
close to the unanimity rule.
Given all these results involving the weakening of Arrow’s transitivity requirement, it
is not surprising to ﬁnd attacks focusing directly on rationality itself. Both Schwartz [21]
and Plott [16; 17; 18] have criticized the demand for the existence of rationalizations.
Plott [18] argues that a major reason for Arrow’s insistence on transitive rationality was
that it ensured that the social choice would be invariant under arbitrary manipulations
of the agenda, that is, the order and method by which alternatives are compared and
inferior ones discarded (see Arrow [2, p.120]). He proposes a consistency requirement for
choice functions which he calls path independence:
The alternatives are “split up” into smaller sets, a choice is made over
each of these sets, the chosen elements are collected, and then a choice is
made from them. Path independence, in this case, would mean that the ﬁnal
result would be independent of the way the alternatives were initially divided
up for consideration (Plott [17, pp.1079-1080]).1
A fairly natural question now arises: What happens to impossibility theorems when path
independence is substituted for transitive rationality and the remaining Arrovian con-
ditions prevail? Plott [17, 18] observes, citing Sen [22] as a source, that the collective
choice rule which chooses the Pareto optimal subsets from available alternatives sets
serves as a counterexample to a proposed impossibility result. Unfortunately this collec-
tive choice rule runs afoul of Gibberd’s theorem; it is also too undiscriminating in the
face of heterogeneous individual preferences. It is important to notice that there exist
path-independent choice functions which have no rationalization. Plott’s position on im-
possibility results with path independence but without rationality is ambiguous. He has
said that “some of the standard constructions in welfare economics such as social welfare
functions and social preference relations unduly restrict the set of admissible policies and
consequently induce impossibility results” (Plott [16, p.182]) and that, with the relax-
ation of rationality, “the immediate impossibility result discovered by Arrow is avoided”
(Plott [17, p.1075]). He has been careful, however, to observe that “the lines which
separate rationality properties, which induce immediate impossibility results, from path
independence properties are very thinly drawn” [17, p.1075]. Blair [4] and Parks [15] have
exhibited examples of collective choice rules which can result in path-independent but
not quasi-transitive choices; both, however, suﬀer from the defect that they can generate
choice functions which are not very selective.
1For procedures aggregating preferences over many alternatives, which must of necessity be multistage
processes due to computational costs, path independence is a desirable property for two reasons. First,
it rules out certain forms of institutional arbitrariness, such as bias in favor of the status quo. Second,
it precludes strategic behavior at the agenda-determination stage.
3We prove in this paper several impossibility theorems in which we do not require
social choices to have a rationalization. One of our results shows the incompatibility
of non-weak-dictatorship, the Pareto condition, independence of irrelevant alternatives,
and path independence. Thus the replacement of Arrow’s collective rationality with
Plott’s path independence does not help us to escape from the Arrovian dilemma. Still
weaker consistency properties for social choice functions than path independence will be
proposed. They too, however, fail to provide us with a means of avoiding impossibility
results. As Arrow has written, “the paradox of social choice cannot be so easily exorcised”
[2, p.109].
2 The Structures of Choice Functions
Before presenting our impossibility theorems, we will clarify in this section the relation-
ships between, on one hand, the rationality conditions used in the existing impossibility
theorems and, on the other, path independence and some weaker conditions.
Let X denote the set of (mutually exclusive) alternatives. K stands for a family of
nonempty subsets of X. Each element S 2 K is an admissible agenda; it contains the
currently feasible alternatives in a given choice situation. We assume throughout this
chapter that K contains all nonempty ﬁnite elements of P(X), the power set of X. A
choice function C on K is a function which maps each S 2 K into a nonempty subset
C(S) of S; note that C(S) is not required to be a one-element set: Five properties of
choice functions will be of interest here:
Path independence (PI). C(S1 [ S2) = C(C(S1) [ C(S2)) for all S1;S2 2 K.
Chernoﬀ condition (C). S1 ½ S2 ) C(S2) \ S1 ½ C(S1) for all S1;S2 2 K. That is,
every element chosen out of a set must also be chosen in every subset of the set containing
the element.2
Property ¯. [S1 ½ S2 & C(S1) \ C(S2) 6= ;] ) C(S1) ½ C(S2) for all S1;S2 2 K.
That is, if some chosen element from a set is chosen from a superset of that set, then
every such element is chosen from the superset. (See Sen [24].)
Superset property (S). S1 ½ S2 ) not [C(S2) ( C(S1)]. That is, the choice out of
the superset of a set is not strictly contained in the choice out of the set.
Generalized Condorcet property (GC). (x 2 S & x 2 C(fx;yg) for all y 2 S) ) x 2
C(S) for all S 2 K. That is, if no element in a set beats a given element x in a binary
choice, then x must be among the elements chosen from the set.3
2This condition, ﬁrst introduced by Chernoﬀ [8], has appeared in the literature under a variety of
names including, unhappily, “independence of irrelevant alternatives.” It is discussed extensively by
Arrow in [1].
3The Condorcet condition in its usual form is stated in terms of pairwise comparisons by simple
majority rule. Our condition is a weaker version of Sen’s property °, discussed in [24].
4A preference relation R is a binary relation on X having the interpretation that xRy iﬀ
x is at least as good as y from the point of view of the person or group in question. In the
usual way we deﬁne from R the subrelations P of strict preference and I of indiﬀerence.
R is complete iﬀ xRy of yRx, transitive iﬀ xRy & yRz ) xRz, quasi-transitive iﬀ P is
transitive, and acyclic iﬀ (x1Px2P :::PxtPx1) for no ﬁnite subset fx1;:::;xtg of X. A
transitive and complete relation will be called a transitive ordering.
Choice functions induce preference relations in two ways. If there exists a preference
relation R satisfying C(S) = fx 2 S : xRy for all y 2 Sg for all S 2 K, the choice
function C will be called rational (R); in that event R is a rationalization of C. A choice
function is transitive rational (TR), quasi-transitive rational (QTR), or acyclic rational
(AR) if it has a rationalization with the requisite property.
Alternatively, a preference relation may be derived from choice functions restricted to
two-element agenda sets. Even if C has no rationalization, we can always deﬁne, following
Herzberger [12], the base relation R¤ as follows: xR¤y iﬀ x 2 C(fx;yg) for all fx;yg 2 K.
Strict preference P ¤ may be deﬁned in the obvious way. A choice function will then be
said to satisfy base quasi-transitivity (BQT) iﬀ R¤ is quasi-transitive, base acyclicity (BA)
iﬀ R¤ is acyclic, and base triple acyclicity (BTA) iﬀ xP ¤y & yP ¤z ) xR¤z.
We turn now to comparing these consistency conditions by decomposing several of
them into more basic parts. Sen [24] has proven that a choice function has a transitive
rationalization iﬀ it satisﬁes both property ¯ and the Chernoﬀ condition. Plott [17], in
turn, has shown that quasi-transitive rationality is equivalent to the conjunction of path
independence and the generalized Condorcet property. The relationship between these
results becomes more apparent when we further decompose path independence.
Theorem 1. A choice function is path independent if and only if it satisﬁes the
Chernoﬀ condition and the superset property.
Proof. First we show that path independence implies the Chernoﬀ condition. Let
S1 ½ S2, and let x 2 S1\C(S2). By path independence, C(S2) = C[C(S2nS1)[ C(S1)] ½
C(S2 n S1) [ C(S1). Since x 2 S1;x = 2 S2 n S1, so x = 2 C(S2 n S1). Hence x 2 C(S1);
therefore S1 \ C(S2) ½ C(S1).
Next we show that path independence implies the superset property. Suppose, con-
trary to that condition, that S1 ½ S2 and C(S2) ( C(S1). By path independence,
C(S2) = C[C(S2) [ C(S1)] = C[C(S1)]. By the ﬁrst part of this proof, the Chernoﬀ
condition holds, so that from C(S1) ½ S1 we can derive C(S1)\C(S1) ½ C[C(S1)]; thus
C[C(S1)] = C(S1). This yields C(S1) = C(S2), a contradiction.
Finally, we obtain path independence from the superset property and the Chernoﬀ
condition. Suppose x 2 C(S1 [S2). If x 2 S1, the Chernoﬀ condition implies x 2 C(S1);
if x 2 S2, then x 2 C(S2). Hence x 2 C(S1) [ C(S2) ½ S1 [ S2. By another application
of the Chernoﬀ condition, x 2 C[C(S1) [ C(S2)]. Thus C(S1 [ S2) ½ C[C(S1) [ C(S2)].
The inclusion cannot be strict, however, because of the superset property and the fact
that C(S1 [ S2) ½ C[C(S1) [ C(S2)]. Therefore, C(S1 [ S2) = C[C(S1) [ C(S2)].
What we now know is that quasi-transitive rationality is equivalent to the conjunction
of the Chernoﬀ condition, the superset property, and the generalized Condorcet prop-
5erty, and that if the generalized Condorcet property is no longer required we have path
independence. Suppose we retain the Chernoﬀ condition and the generalized Condorcet
property but do not require that the superset property hold. Theorem 2 demonstrates
that what remains is acyclicity.
Theorem 2. If a choice function C on K satisﬁes the Chernoﬀ condition and the
generalized Condorcet property and if K contains all ﬁnite nonempty subsets of X, it
has a unique, complete, reﬂexive, acyclic rationalization. If a choice function is induced
by an acyclic relation, it satisﬁes the Chernoﬀ condition and the generalized Condorcet
property.
Proof. Beginning with the ﬁrst proposition, we assume C satisﬁes the conditions
stated. Each two-element subset of X belongs to K, so the only possible rationalization
is the base relation R¤:
xR
¤y iﬀ x 2 C(fx;yg):
If x 2 C(S), then, by the Chernoﬀ condition, x 2 C(fx;yg) for each y 2 S. On the
other hand, if x 2 C(fx;yg) for all y 2 S, then x 2 C(S) by the generalized Condorcet
property. Thus,
C(S) = fx 2 S : x 2 C(fx;yg) for all y 2 Sg
= fx 2 S : xR
¤y for all y 2 Sg;
i.e., R¤ is in fact a rationalization of C. Completeness and reﬂexivity of R¤ are ob-
vious: it remains to show that R¤ is acyclic. Suppose that x1P ¤x2P ¤ :::P ¤xn, i.e.,
xi = 2 C(fxi¡1;xig) for i = 2;:::;n. By the Chernoﬀ condition, xi = 2 C(fx1;x2;:::;xng)
for i = 2;:::;n. By our assumption about the content of K, C(fx1;x2;:::;xng) 6= ;,
so C(fx1;x2;:::;xng) = fx1g. By another application of the Chernoﬀ condition, x1 2
C(fx1;xng), that is, not xnP ¤x1, as was to be shown.
Turning now to the second assertion, for each S 2 K,
C(S) = fx 2 S : xRy for all y 2 Sg = fx 2 S : not (9y)(y 2 S & yPx)g;
where R is acyclic. Suppose x 2 C(fx;yg) for all y 2 S. Then xRy for all y 2 S, that
is, x 2 C(S); the generalized Condorcet property therefore holds. Suppose x 2 C(S2)
and x 2 S1 ½ S2. Now x 2 C(S2) implies xRy for all y 2 S2, which implies xRy for all
y 2 S1. Hence x 2 C(S1), and the Chernoﬀ condition holds.
Theorems 1 and 2, coupled with Plott’s theorem, imply that the only path-independent
choice functions which are acyclic rational are those which are quasi-transitive rational
as well. We have earlier remarked that path-independent choice functions exist which
are not rational (see Plott [17]). It should now be clear that there exist rational choice
functions which violate path independence; indeed, the choice function induced by any
acyclic but not quasi-transitive preference relation falls in this category.
The following example shows that the Chernoﬀ condition implies neither path inde-
pendence nor the existence of a rationalization:
6Example. Let X = fx;y;zg and K = P(X) n f;g. The choice function deﬁned by
C(X) = fxg and C(S) = S for all S ( X is easily shown to satisfy the Chernoﬀ condition.
It is not path-independent, however, since C(fx;y;zg) = fxg ( fx;yg = C(fx;yg),
which contradicts the superset property. If C has any rationalization it must be universal
indiﬀerence, given C(S) = S for all two-element S, but this contradicts C(X) = fxg.
Finally, we relate path independence and the Chernoﬀ condition to the properties of
the base relation.
Lemma 1. Path independence implies base quasi-transitivity. The Chernoﬀ condition
implies base acyclicity.
Proof. Suppose that C is path-independent and that xP ¤yP ¤z for some x;y;z 2 X.
By path independence, fxg = C(fx;yg) = C[C(fxg) [ C(fy;zg)] = C(fx;y;zg) =
C[C(fx;yg) [ C(fzg)] = C(fx;zg). Hence xP ¤z, so R¤ is quasi-transitive.
The second proposition is established by an argument already given in the ﬁrst part
of the proof of Theorem 2.
Counterexamples to the converse of Lemma 1’s assertions are left for the reader to
construct.
We conclude this section with an implication diagram which summarizes the results
presented here and other relationships which follow easily from the deﬁnitions. The
properties in parentheses are jointly equivalent to the conditions above them. Note that
the equivalence of rationality and acyclic rationality is dependent on our assumption that
K includes all ﬁnite nonempty subsets of X.






Suppose that there are n individuals and let N = f1;2;:::;ng; it is assumed that 2 · n <
1. X stands for the set of social alternatives, now taken to have at least three elements.
The problem at hand is to characterize the institutionally and ethically “acceptable”
collective choice rules; such a rule F is a function which maps each proﬁle, or n-tuple
of individual transitive preference orderings of X, into the set of choice functions on K.
(Note that what is called here a collective choice rule is analogous to Arrow’s [2] social
welfare function, and that choice functions play in this analysis the same role as Arrow’s
social preference ordering.) The domain of F is the set of all logically possible proﬁles.
7Formally, given a proﬁle k, society’s choice function C is given by C = F(k). However,
the function F will be ﬁxed throughout the proof of each of the subsequent theorems.
We will therefore frequently not refer explicitly to F, but rather will simply write Ck(S)
for the choice out of agenda set S under proﬁle k, given the ﬁxed collective choice rule.
When the proﬁle is invariant, we will suppress the superscript as well and merely write
C(S).
All of the rationality and consistency requirements studied in Section 2 are properties
of choice functions, that is, of elements of the range of collective choice rules. Each of
these conditions will also be attributed to a collective choice rule F in the event that,
for every proﬁle, the choice function determined by F satisﬁes the given condition. For
example, we will call a collective choice rule path-independent if the image of every proﬁle
under the rule is a path-independent choice function.
A further set of deﬁnitions is necessary before proceeding to the results of this section.
A set of individuals J ½ N is decisive for x against y (resp. weakly decisive for x
against y) iﬀ xPiy for all i 2 J and jPix for all i = 2 J implies fxg = C(fx;yg)(resp: x 2
C(fx;yg)).
If V is decisive for some a against some b, and W being decisive for some x against
some y implies that the number of individuals in W is at least as great as the number of
individuals in V , then V is a smallest decisive set.
Individual i is a dictator (resp. weak dictator) iﬀ for all x;y 2 X;xPiy implies fxg =
C(fx;yg)(resp: x 2 C(fx;yg)).
A collective choice rule is said to satisfy:
The Pareto condition iﬀ for any proﬁle k such that xPiy for all i 2 N, we have
fxg = Ck(fx;yg).
Nondictatorship iﬀ there exists no dictator.
Non-weak-dictatorship iﬀ there exists no weak dictator.
Positive responsiveness iﬀ k is a proﬁle resulting in x 2 Ck(fx;yg) and l is another
proﬁle with Rk
j = Rl
j for all j 6= i and either (yP k
i x & xIl
iy) or (yIk
i x & xP l
iy), implies
fxg = Cl(fx;yg), where i 2 N is any speciﬁed individual.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives iﬀ for any two proﬁles j = (R1;:::;Rn) and
k = (R0
1;:::;R0
n) such that (xRiy , xR0
iy & yRix , yR0
ix) for all i 2 N, we have
Cj(fx;yg) = Ck(fx;yg).
Notice that our independence condition restricts its attention to choices from two-
element sets, in contrast with Arrow’s independence axiom. Although the two conditions
are equivalent for rational collective choice rules, our axiom is strictly weaker if rationality
is not imposed.
Proﬁles will be written horizontally with more preferred alternatives to the left; in-
diﬀerence will be indicated by parentheses. For example, the expression
V : x; (y;z)
8means that every individual in V prefers x to both y and z, between which indiﬀerence
prevails.
We now proceed to establish an impossibility theorem using only path independence
rather than Arrow’s transitive rationality. The theorem is otherwise Arrovian except for
a slight strengthening of the nondictatorship condition.
Theorem 3. If there are at least three voters, there is no collective choice rule
satisfying all of:
(1) path independence,
(2) the Pareto condition,
(3) independence of irrelevant alternatives, and
(4) non-weak-dictatorship.
In view of Lemma 1, we can establish this proposition by proving the following stronger
result, which utilizes the weaker condition of base quasi-transitivity. An alternative proof
of Theorem 4 is given by Fishburn [9, Theorem 16.2].
Theorem 4. If there are at least three voters, there is no collective choice rule
satisfying all of:
(1) base quasi-transitivitiy,
(2) the Pareto condition,
(3) independence of irrelevant alternatives, and
(4) non-weak-dictatorship.
This proposition follows immediately from the three lemmas below.
Lemma 2. If a collective choice rule satisﬁes the Pareto condition, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, and base quasi-transitivity, and if i is decisive for some x;y 2 X,
then i is a dictator; that is,
(xPiy & yPjx for all j 6= i ) fxg = C(fx;yg))
) (For all s;t 2 X : sPit ) fsg = C(fs;tg)).
Proof. We ﬁrst show
(xPiy & yPjx for all j 6= i ) fxg = C(fx;yg))
) (For all s 2 X : sPiy ) fsg = C(fs;yg)). (1)
Suppose not. Then there exists a proﬁle such that xPiy and yPjx for all j 6= i implies
fxg = C(fx;yg);sPiy, and fsg 6= C(fs;yg):
i : s;x;y;
N n fig: (some n ¡ 1-tuple of orderings of y and s), x.
9By assumption, fxg = C(fx;yg). By the Pareto condition fsg = C(fs;xg).
Base quasi-transitivity then implies that, under this proﬁle fsg = C(fs;yg). By inde-
pendence, fsg = C(fs;yg) under every proﬁle in which sPiy, since no speciﬁcation has
been made of other voters’ preferences between these alternatives. This contradiction
establishes (1). Next we show
(For all s 2 X : sPiy & yPjs for all j 6= i ) fsg = C(fs;yg))
) (For all s;t 2 X : sPit ) fsg = C(fs;tg)). (2)
The antecedent of (2) is implied by (1). Suppose (2) is false. Then there exists a proﬁle
such that sPiy and yPjs for all j 6= i ) fsg = C(fs;yg);sPit, and fsg 6= C(fs;tg):
i : s;y;t;
N n fig: y, (some n ¡ 1-tuple of orderings of s and t).
By assumption, fsg = C(fs;yg) and by the Pareto condition, fyg = C(fy;tg). Base
quasi-transitivity shows that under this proﬁle fsg = C(fs;tg). By independence, the
social choice is the same for all proﬁles in which sPit holds, contradicting our assumption
and establishing (2).
Lemma 3. If a collective choice rule satisﬁes independence of irrelevant alternatives,
the Pareto condition, and base quasi-transitivity, and if i is weakly decisive for some
x;y 2 X, then i is a weak dictator; that is,
(xPiy & yPjx for all j 6= i ) x 2 C(fx;yg))
) (For all s;t 2 X : sPit ) s 2 C(fs;tg)).
The proof of this lemma is virtually identical to that of Lemma 2 and is omitted.
Lemma 4. if V is a smallest decisive set with respect to a and b under a collective
choice rule satisfying base quasi-transitivity, the Pareto condition, nondictatorship, and
independence of irrelevant alternatives, then
V contains at least two individuals; (3)
and every i 2 V is a weak dictator: (4)
Proof. Assertion (3) is obvious from Lemma 2 and nondictatorship. To establish (4),
we must show:
If i 2 V;xPiy ) x 2 C(fx;yg) for some x;y 2 X:
Suppose not. Then for some a;z 2 X, there exists a proﬁle of the form:
i : a;z;
N n fig: (some n ¡ 1-tuple of orderings of a and z).
10such that fzg = C(fa;zg). Let W ½ V and V nW = fig. Consider the following further
speciﬁcation of the previous proﬁle:
i : a;b;z;
W: (same individual orderings as before between a and z), b,
N n V : b, (same individual orderings as before between a and z).
We know C(fa;zg) = fzg and, because of V ’s decisiveness for a over b, C(fa;bg) = fag.
By base quasi-transitivity, fzg = C(fb;zg) under the proﬁle in question. But this implies
that W is decisive for z against b, which contradicts the minimality of V . Thus, if i 2 V ,
i is weakly decisive for some x against y;x;y 2 X. By Lemma 3, such an individual is a
weak dictator, establishing (4).
Proof of Theorem 4. Every dictator is a weak dictator, so prohibiting weak dicta-
tors rules out dictators too. If a collective choice rule satisﬁes base quasi-transitivity,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto condition, and has no weak dictators
(and thus no dictator either), then Lemma 4 yields the conclusion that there must exist
a weak dictator, which contradiction proves the theorem.
Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein’s [14] result on the inconsistency of quasi-transitivity
and positive responsiveness in the presence of the Arrovian conditions carries over in a
straightforward manner to the case of irrational path independence, and thence to base
quasi-transitivity:
Theorem 5. If there are at least three voters, there is no collective choice rule
satisfying all of :
(1) base quasi-transitivity,
(2) the Pareto condtion,
(3) nondictatorship,
(4) independence of irrelevant alternatives, and
(5) positive responsiveness.
Proof. By Lemma 4, there exist at least two weak dictators; call them 1,2. Suppose
under some proﬁle xP1y and yP2x for some x;y 2 X; by weak dictatorship, fx;yg =
C(fx;yg), regardless of the preferences of others voters, of whom there exists at least
one. This violates positive responsiveness.
In view of the impossibility theorems discussed in the Introduction and the new results
just presented, one might be tempted to retreat and demand the imposition only of the
Chernoﬀ condition which, as we have seen, is strictly weaker than both acyclicity and
path independence. This condition is an appealing one to impose on collective choice
rules. It is clearly desirable in piecemeal choice mechanisms where choices are made from
unions of choices over subsets. If an alternative fails to be chosen in some subset, it need
not be considered again at a later stage, for the contra-positive of the Chernoﬀ condition
ensures that the alternative will not be among the ﬁnal choices. Arrow’s justiﬁcation
11in [2, pp.26-27] for his independence axiom is obviously instead an argument for this
condition. See also Sen [23, p.17]. Nevertheless, as the following theorems demonstrate,
the Chernoﬀ condition standing alone as a rationality condition must also be rejected,
at least if the Arrovian conditions are found compelling.4
Theorem 6. If there are at least four voters, there is no collective choice rule satis-
fying all of:
(1) the Chernoﬀ condition,
(2) the Pareto condition,
(3) non-weak-dictatorship,
(4) independence of irrelevant alternatives, and
(5) positive responsiveness.
As in the case of Theorem 3, we will establish this result by proving an even stronger
proposition. By Lemma 1, the Chernoﬀ condition implies base acyclicity, and it is obvious
from the deﬁnitions that base acyclicity implies base triple acyclicity.
Theorem 7. If there are at least four voters, there is no collective choice rule satis-
fying all of:
(1) base triple acyclicity,
(2) the Pareto condtion,
(3) non-weak-dictatorship,
(4) independence of irrelevant alternatives, and
(5) positive responsiveness.
Proof. We will proceed in two steps. First, assuming all of the conditions in the
theorem except non-weak-dictatorship, we will show that there exists a voter who is
weakly decisive for some pair of alternatives. We will then show that individual is a weak
dictator, contradicting the third condition in the theorem.
Step 1. We must show that if a collective choice rule satisﬁes base triple acyclicity, the
Pareto condition, independence, and positive responsiveness, there exists an individual
i 2 N and alternatives x;y 2 X such that:
(xPiy & yPjx for all j 6= i) ) x 2 C(fx;yg). (5)
4The existence of collective choice rules which satisfy the Chernoﬀ condition but are neither path-
independent nor rational is guaranteed by the following proposition, which is easily veriﬁed: the rule
which makes the collective choice equal to the union of individuals’ choices from the feasible set satisﬁes
the Chernoﬀ condition, if the individuals’ preferences satisfy that condition as well. The group’s choice
function is precisely the one given in the example in Section 2 if the group has two members with the
following acyclic preferences: xP1y;yP1z;xI1z;xP2z;zP2y;xI2y, and the collective choice rule is the
union-rule just described.
12Suppose (5) is false. Then for all x;y 2 X and all i 2 N, if a proﬁle a is such that under
it xPiy and yPjx for all j 2 N nfig, then Ca(fx;yg) = fyg. Let V be a smallest decisive
set; V is decisive for some x against y. Our assumption implies that V contains at least
two individuals, say 1 and 2. Partition V as V = f1;2g [ V ¤. Consider proﬁle b:
1: x;y;z
f2g [ V ¤ : z;x;y
N n V : y;z;x:
By the deﬁnition of V , fxg = Cb(fx;yg), and by assumption, Cb(fx;zg) = fzg. By base
triple acyclicity, z 2 Cb(fy;zg). Now consider proﬁle c:
1: x;y
2: y;x
V ¤ : x;y
N n V : y;x:
Since V is a smallest decisive set, y 2 Cc(fx;yg). Next consider proﬁle d:
1: (x;y;z)
2: z;y;x
V ¤ : x;z;y
N n V : y;x;z:
Comparing proﬁles, c and d, and noting the conclusion drawn from the former, positive
responsiveness and independence require that fyg = Cd(fx;yg). Comparing proﬁles b
and d, the same two axioms require that fzg = Cd(fy;zg). Base triple acyclicity then
yields z 2 Cd(fx;zg). Next examine proﬁle e:
1: z;x
2: z;x
V ¤ : x;z
N n V : x;z:
Comparing proﬁles d and e, positive responsiveness and independence require that fzg =
Ce(fx;zg). This conclusion and independence imply that f1;2g is decisive for z against
x, so that V = f1;2g. Finally examine proﬁle f:
1: x;y;z
2: z;x;y
N n V : y;z;x:
Since V is decisive for x against y, fxg = Cf(fx;yg), while our assumption yields fyg =
Cf(fy;zg). By base triple acyclicity, x 2 Cf(fx;zg), in contradiction to our assumption.
Thus we have shown that voter 1 is weakly decisive for x against z.
13Step 2. In this step we show that if voter 1 is weakly decisive for x against y, then
he or she is a weak dictator, if there are at least four voters. In the presence of positive
responsiveness, this can be established by proving that for all s;t 2 X,
(sP1t & tPjs for all j 2 N n f1g) ) s 2 C(fs;tg). (6)
We will prove only that for all t 2 X,
(xP1t & tPjx for all j 2 N n f1g) ) s 2 C(fx;tg). (7)
The steps from (7) to (6) are suﬃciently similar to the ones we use in establishing (7)





N n f1;2;3;4g : y;t;x:
By Step 1 and positive responsiveness, Ca(fx;yg) = fxg. By the Pareto condition,





N n f1;2;3;4g : t;y;x:
Comparing proﬁles a and b, positive responsiveness and independence require that Cb(fx;
tg) = fxg. By the Pareto condition, Cb(fx;yg) = fyg. Base triple acyclicity then implies





N n f1;2;3;4g : t;y;x:
By Step 1 and positive responsiveness, Cc(fx;yg) = fxg. Comparing proﬁles b and
c, positive responsiveness and independence require that Cc(fy;tg) = fyg. Another





14N n f1;2;3;4g : t;y;x:
Comparing proﬁles c and d, positive responsiveness and independence require Cd(fx;tg) =
fxg; by the Pareto condition fyg = Cd(fx;yg). Base triple acyclicity then yields





N n f1;2;3;4g : t;y;x:
Comparing proﬁles d and e, positive responsiveness and independence again require fyg =
Ce(fy;tg). By Step 1 and positive responsiveness, Ce(fx;yg) = fxg. A ﬁnal application
of base triple acyclicity yields x 2 Ce(fx;tg). In view of the independence axiom, this
proves (7).
4 Concluding Remarks
Arrow and subsequent writers have modeled the output of collective decision-making
institutions as binary social preference relations, both by analogy with consumers’ pref-
erences in demand theory and as a generalization of Condorcet’s proposal that any al-
ternative which received a majority of votes against every other candidate should be
chosen. Such a view, as the well-known series of impossibility theorems demonstrates,
is inconsistent with a set of several democratic requirements. In this chapter we have
shown that binary rationality per se is not the culprit in these theorems.
We have taken a more general view, and required only that the group makes a
nonempty choice from every ﬁnite feasible set of alternatives. Several weak conditions
imposed on the resultant choice of functions are each shown to contradict one or more
of the same democratic requirements, even if the choices have no binary rationalization.
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17Chapter 10
Remarks on the Theory of Collective Choice¤
Ever since the so-called paradox of voting was generalized by Arrow [2] to every demo-
cratic method of collective decision-making, a vast literature has appeared (a) trying to
circumvent Arrow’s diﬃculty by weakening some of his conditions (Bordes [6]; Hansson
[12]; Plott [15]; Sen [20]); (b) proposing some other paradoxes in the theory of collective
choice (Batra and Pattanaik [3]; Hansson [11]; Schwarts [19]; Sen [21]) and (c) casting
doubts about the relevance of Arrow’s theorem to the theory of Paretian welfare eco-
nomics (Bergson [4]; Little [14], Samuelson [17; 18]). The purpose of this chapter is to
make some remarks on these recent developments in the theory of collective choice.
The ﬁrst part of the chapter deals with the question of how much one needs to weaken
Arrow’s collective rationality condition in order to avoid his impossibility result. As is
well known, Arrow [2] imposed the collective rationality condition that the society can
arrange all conceivable alternatives in order of preference and that, if some available
set of alternatives is speciﬁed, the society must choose therefrom the best alternative(s)
with respect to that preference ordering. We will consider two conditions of consistent
choice which are weaker than that of Arrow. The ﬁrst condition requires that, if an
alternative x is chosen over another alternative y in binary choice, y should never be
chosen from any set of alternatives that contains x; while the second condition requires
that, if x is chosen over y in binary choice, there exists no choice situation in which
y is chosen and x is available but rejected. (In the second case y can be chosen if
x is also chosen, while in the ﬁrst case y cannot be chosen anyway.) There seems to
be a gulf that separates possibility from impossibility in between these two seemingly
similar consistency conditions. It will be shown that the ﬁrst consistency requirement
is incompatible with essentially Arrovian conditions on the collective choice rule, while
the second consistency condition is compatible with the same conditions. Although the
diﬀerence between these consistency requirements is very subtle, the implication thereof
in the context of impossibility result is therefore dramatically diﬀerent.
Lest we should be too satisﬁed, we must hasten to add that no collective choice rule
satisfying our second consistency requirement can be free from the paradox of a Paretian
liberal (Sen [21]; Batra and Pattanaik [3]).
¤First published in Economica, Vol.43, 1976, pp.381-390. Thanks are due to Professors A. K. Sen
and G. Bordes for their comments. They are, of course, not responsible for any remaining deﬁciencies
of this chapter. Thanks are also due to an anonymous referee and the editor of Economica.
18The Arrow-Sen theory is then contrasted with the Bergson-Samuelson one. In view
of doing this, it is convenient to remember that Arrow’s incompatible conditions on
collective choice rule can be classiﬁed into two categories. The ﬁrst category consists of
statements that apply to any ﬁxed proﬁle of individual preference relations, while the
second category refers to the responsiveness of the collective choice to the variations in
proﬁles. (The ﬁrst category embraces the condition of collective rationality and the Pareto
rule, while the second category consists of the independence of irrelevant alternatives
and non-dictatorship. See Sections I and II below for the deﬁnition of these conditions.)
Begson [4], Little [14] and Samuelson [17; 18] agreed with Arrow so far as his conditions
of the ﬁrst category were concerned. It was only when Arrow went on to introduce
some conditions of the second category that Bergson, Little and Samuelson come to deny
the reasonableness and/or necessity thereof. Let us, therefore, ﬁx a proﬁle of individual
preference relations. What we call the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering is an
ordering R such that, if a state x is Pareto-non-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) to a state
y with respect to the given proﬁle, then x is not less preferred (resp. preferred) to y in
terms of R. (Incidentally, the Bergson-Samuleson social welfare function is a numerical
function u such that u(x) ¸ u(y) if and only if xRy for all states x and y.) Now we raise
the problem of whether we can deﬁne such a social welfare ordering corresponding to a
given proﬁle. The answer is in the aﬃrmative if each and every individual preference
relation satisﬁes a strong consistency condition of transitivity. The main purpose in
this part is to strengthen this in that a social welfare ordering exists if and only if the
Paretian unanimity rule corresponding to the given proﬁle satisﬁes what we call the axiom
of consistency. (Thus, even if intransitive individual preference is countenanced, we may
still have a well-deﬁned social welfare ordering.) This will be done by proving a general
theorem on the extension of a binary relation.
What emerges as a result of our investigation is an ever sharper contrast between
the variable proﬁle framework of the Arrow-Sen theory, on the one hand, and the ﬁxed
proﬁle framework of the Bergson-Little-Samuelson theory, on the other.
All the proofs are relegated into the ﬁnal section which can be neglected by those
who are not interested in technical details.
1 Rationality and Revealed Preference
For the sake of logical clarity, we discuss in this section the concept of rationality and
that of revealed preference in abstraction from the problem of collective decision. The
heart of our argument is the implication diagram given at the end of this section.
Let X be the set of all alternatives that are mutually exclusive. We assume that X
contains at least three distinct elements. Also let K stand for the family of non-empty
subsets of X, containing all the pairs and all the triples taken from X (and possibly
more). A preference relation is a binary relation on X. Let R be a binary relation. By
xRy (or, equivalently, (x;y) 2 R) we mean that x is at least as good as y. By xPy and
xIy we mean, respectively, (xRy and not yRx) and (xRy and yRx). An R is said to be
reﬂexive if (xRx for all x 2 X), complete if (xRy and/or yRx for all x;y 2 X). transitive
19if (xRy and yRz ) xRz for all x;y;z 2 X), and acyclic if (x1Px2 :::xtPx1 for no ﬁnite
subset fx1;x2;:::;xtg of X). A quasi-ordering is a reﬂexive and transitive relation and
an ordering is a complete quasi-ordering.
Given a preference relation R and an S 2 K, we deﬁne:
(1) GR(S) = fx : x 2 S and xRy for all y 2 Sg:
Clearly GR(S) is a subset of S such that x¤ 2 GR(S) has the following property: x¤ is
at least as good as any alternative in S.
A choice functioin on K is a function C which assigns a non-empty subset C(S) of
S to each S 2 K. (It is intended that S 2 K represents a set of available alternatives
and C(S) represents the set of chosen elements from S.) We say that C is rational (R)
if there exists a preference relation R, to be called a rationalization of C, such that
(2) C(S) = GR(S) for all S 2 K:
In other words, a choice function is rational if it can be construed as a result of preference
optimization. (It should be noted that the concept of rational choice in itself has noting
to do with the transitivity of rationalization.) We say, in particular, that C is regular-
rational (RR) if (a) C is rational and (b) a rationalization thereof is an ordering. Arrow
[1] has shown that C is (RR) if and only if, for all S1 and S2 in K such that S1 ½ S2 and
S1\C(S2) 6= Á, S1\C(S2) = C(S1) holds true. (In other words, it is required that if some
elements are chosen out of S2, and then the range of alternatives is narrowed to S1 but
still contains some previously chosen elements, no previously rejected element becomes
chosen and no previously chosen element becomes unchosen.) This Arrovian property (A)
is to be decomposed into what we call the Bordesian property (B) and the Chernovian
property (C). We say that C satisﬁes (B) (resp. (C)) if and only if, for all S1 and S2 in K
such that S1 ½ S2 and S1 \ C(S2) 6= Á, S1 \ C(S2) ¾ C(S1) (resp. S1 \ C(S2) ½ C(S1)).
The property (B) requires that if some elements are chosen out of S2 and then the range
of alternatives is narrowed to S1 but still contains some previously chosen elements, no
previously unchosen element becomes chosen. The property (C) requires, on the other
hand, that if some elements of subset S1 of S2 are chosen from S2, then they should be
chosen from S1. The property (B) is due to Bordes [6], while the property (C) is named
after Chernoﬀ [8], although in the present context it is better known as Sen’s condition
® (see Sen, [20; 22]).
An alternative formulation of the concept of rational choice goes as follows. Given a
preference relation R and an S 2 K, we deﬁne:
MR(S) = fx : x 2 S and not yPx for all y 2 Sg:
We say that a choice function C is M-rational if there exists a preference relation R, to
be called an M-rationalization, such that C(S) = MR(S) for all S 2 K. In view of some
arguments by Herzberger [13] and Schwartz [19] in favour of the M-rationality concept,
it may be worth our while to investigate how M-rationality will fare in the context of the
impossibility results. In order to do so, let C be M-rational with an M-rationalization R.
20Let us deﬁne a binary relation R0 by fxR0y , (xRy or not yRx)g for all x and y in X.
It can easily be shown that MR(S) = GR0(S) for all S 2 K. Therefore if C is M-rational,
it is rational. This being the case, the concept of M-rationality has no special role to
play in the impossibility exercises (see, however, Suzumura [24]).
So much for rational choice functions. Let us now introduce some axioms of revealed
preference. Our ﬁrst axiom of revealed preference (FARP) and second axiom of revealed
preference (SARP) consider the binary choice of x over y : fxg = C(fx;yg). In this
case, (FARP) requires that there should be no choice situation S 2 K such that x 2 S
and y 2 C(S), while (SARP) requires that there should be no choice situation S 2 K
such that x 2 S n C(S) and y 2 C(S). What these two axioms essentially say is
that the choice pattern revealed in binary choice should never be contradicted in non-
binary choice. Our third revealed preference axiom, which we called in Blair et al. [5]
the base triple acyclicity (BTA), is concerned solely with binary choices. It requires
that if x is chosen over y in binary choice and y is chosen over z in binary choice, x
should never be rejected in the binary choice between x and z : fxg = C(fx;yg) and
fyg = C(fy;zg) ) x 2 C(fx;zg) for all x;y;z 2 X. Finally we introduce the weak
axiom of revealed preference (WARP), due originally to Samuelson [16], who introduced
it in the context of consumers’ behaviour. It says that, if fx 2 C(S) and y 2 S n C(S)g
for some S 2 K, then fx 2 S0 and y 2 C(S0)g for no S0 2 K. Namely, if in some choice
situation x is chosen while y, though available, is rejected, then y should never be chosen
in the presence of x.
Essential for our present purpose is an implication network among these various re-
quirements on the choice function, which is summarized in the implication diagram of
Figure 1. Here, a double-headed arrow indicates equivalence, and a single-headed arrow
indicates implication. Some of these arrows have been established by Arrow [1] and Sen








2 Arrow’s Theorem and Collective Rationality
We are ready to discuss the problem originally posed by Arrow [2]. Suppose that there
exist n individuals in the society and let N = f1;:::;i;:::;ng stand for the index set
of the individuals. In order to exclude a trivial case, we assume that n ¸ 2. An n-
tuple of preference orderings (R1;:::;Ri;:::;Rn), one ordering for each individual, will
be called a proﬁle (of individual preference orderings). Corresponding to Ri, we deﬁne Pi
21by xPiy , (xRiy and not yRix). The problem of collective choice is to ﬁnd a function
F, to be called a collective choice rule (CCR), which aggregates a proﬁle into a collective
choice function:
(3) C = F(R1;:::;Ri;:::;Rn):
If an S 2 K is speciﬁed as an available alternatives set, C(S) represents the set of socially
chosen elements from S when the proﬁle (R1;:::;Ri :::;Rn) prevails. In what follows, we
will always assume universal domain (U) for F: F should be able to aggregate all logically
possible proﬁles. As a matter of terminology, we say that F satisﬁes the property ! if
F always yields a choice function having the property !. (For example, if C determined
by (3) is always rational, we say that F is rational in itself.) Some other conditions on
CCR will be introduced when and where necessity dictates.
Arrow [2] has shown that there exists no CCR that satisﬁes the universal domain
(U), the regular-rationality (RR), the independence of irrelevant alternatives (I), the
Pareto rule (P) and the non-dictatorship (D). Here the conditions (I), (P) and (D) are
deﬁned as follows. Let x and y be any two alternatives. A CCR F is said to sat-




iy and yRix , yR0
ix) for all i 2 N, we have C(fx;yg) = C0(fx;yg); the
condition (P) if, for any proﬁle (R1;:::;Rn) such that xPiy for all i 2 N, we have
fxg = C(fx;yg); the condition (D) if there exists no individual i 2 N such that, for
any proﬁle (R1;:::;Rn), xPiy ) fxg = C(fx;yg). Throughout in what follows we let
C = F(R1;:::;Rn), and C0 = F(R0
1;:::;R0
n).
Among these Arrow’s incompatible conditions on CCR, (P) and (D) can hardly be
objectionable, so that the culprit for Arrow’s phantom should be sought among (U),
(RR) and (I). In what follows, our attention will be focused upon the condition (RR).
(The relevance of the condition (U) is extensively discussed in Sen [21, Chapter 10] in the
context of simple majority decision, while condition (I) is critically examined by Hansson
[12].) Can we circumvent Arrow’s diﬃculty by weakening (RR) to some reasonable
extent?
In order to prepare for our answer to this question, it is necessary to introduce some
more conditions on CCR. First, there is the condition of the non-weak-dictatorship (WD).
Let x and y be any two alternatives. We say that F satisﬁes the condition (WD) if
there exists no i 2 N such that, for any proﬁle (R1;:::;Rn);xPiy ) x 2 C(fx;yg).
Clearly (WD) is a stronger version of (D). Second, there is the condition of the positive
responsiveness (PR). Let i 2 N be any prescribed individual and let x and y be any two
alternatives. We say that F satisﬁes the condition (PR) if (a) (R1;:::;Rn) is a proﬁle
resulting in x 2 C(fx;yg), and (b) (R0
1;:::;R0
n) is another proﬁle with Rj = R0
j for all
j 2 N n fig and f(yPix and xI0
iy) or (xIiy and xP 0
iy)g, then fxg = C0(fx;yg):
We now put forward two theorems which are relevant in the context of the question
raised in this section.
Theorem 1. If n ¸ 4, there exists no CCR which satisﬁes (U), (FARP), (P), (I), (WD)
and (PR).
22Theorem 2. There exists a CCR which satisﬁes (U), (SARP), (P), (I), (WD) and (PR).
Note that the impossibility in Theorem 1 is turned into the possibility in Theorem
2 by simply replacing the condition (FARP) by the condition (SARP). Put diﬀerently,
in the presence of (U), (P), (I), (WD) and (PR), the gulf that separates possibility from
impossibility is located by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 as being in between (FARP) and
(SARP).
3 Paradise Lost
It is now time to make some observations by comparing Arrow’s theorem, Theorem 1
and Theorem 2. First, let us compare Theorem 1 with Arrow’s theorem. In Theorem
1, Arrow’s rationality condition (RR) is substantially weakened into (FARP), but (D)
is strengthened into (WD), and (PR) (which does not appear in Arrow’s theorem) is
invoked. Therefore, strictly speaking, Theorem 1 is not a generalization of Arrow’s theo-
rem. It may, however, be claimed that (WD) and (PR) are still reasonable conditions on
a democratic collective choice rule and our Theorem 1 may be taken to mean that Ar-
row’s diﬃculty cannot be got rid of even if his rationality condition (RR) is substantially
weakened.
Let us next compare Theorem 1 with Theorem 2. We have noticed already that,
although (FARP) and (SARP) look quite similar, their implications in the context of
collective choice are very disparate. The contrast being sharp, we might be tempted
to say that the Arrovian impossibility depended squarely on the unjustiﬁably strong
collective rationality requirement such as (FARP) and that if we replaced (FARP) by
a weaker (SARP), the Arrovian phantom would go. Life would be happier then for
democrats if this could really be the end of the story. Unfortunately, however, this is not
the case. The gist is that the theory of collective choice is full of disturbing paradoxes
and Arrow’s theorem is only one eminent example.
Two more conditions on the CCR are to be introduced. The ﬁrst one is a strengthened
version of the Pareto rule (P). Let S be any set in K and let (R1;:::;Rn) be any
proﬁle. Let y be any point in S. We say that F satisﬁes the strong Pareto rule (SP) if
f(xPiy for all i 2 N) for some x 2 Sg ) y = 2 C(S). In words, y should not be chosen out
of S if there exists an x in S that is unanimously preferred to y. The second condition
is what Sen [21] called the condition of minimal liberalism (ML), which reads as follows.
There are at least two individuals such that for each of them there is at least one pair of
alternatives over which he is decisive; that is, there is a pair of x;y such that if he prefers
x (respectively y) to y (respectively x), then society should prefer x (respectively y) to y
(respectively x) (Sen [21, p.154]).
Sen [21] has shown that there exists no CCR that satisﬁes universal domain (U),
rationality (R), the Pareto rule (P) and minimal liberalism (ML). This so-called liberal
paradox has been generalized by Batra and Pattanaik [3], from which it follows that
there exists no CCR that satisﬁes (U), (SARP), (SP) and (ML). This being the case, we
cannot but say that, although the replacement of (FARP) by (SARP) fares quite well
23in exorcising the Arrovian phantom, it cannot let the CCR be free from Sen’s liberal
paradox. The cloud is thicker here because the independence condition (I) (which has
also been suspected to be a possible culprit for Arrow’s diﬃculty) does not play any
role at all in establishing Sen’s paradox. Our conclusion is that, even if the collective
rationality condition is substantially weakened, we cannot eradicate the paradoxes of
collective decision.
4 Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Ordering
We now turn to discuss the logical foundation of the Bergson-Samuelson theory of Pare-
tian welfare economics. It has long been lamented that Arrow gave his collective choice
rule, which is, in our terminology, a regular-rational CCR, the name of social welfare
function. Clearly it is completely diﬀerent from the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function which, according to Little, is “a ‘process or rule’ which would indicate the best
economic state as a function of a changing environment (i.e. changing sets of possibili-
ties deﬁned by diﬀerent economic transformation functions), the individual tastes being
given” (Little [14, p.423], Little’s italics). It is also claimed that “the only axiom re-
stricting Bergson social welfare function (of individualistic type) is a ‘tree’ property of
Pareto-optimality type” (Samuelson [17, p.49]). The purpose of the rest of this chapter
is to examine the possibility of this ﬁxed proﬁle theory of Paretian welfare economics.
Let us, therefore, ﬁx a proﬁle (R1;:::;Ri;:::;Rn) of the individual preference rela-
tions. Let a binary relation Q, to be called the Pareto unanimity relation, be deﬁned by
(xQy , xRiy for all i 2 N) for all x;y;2 X. The asymmetric component PQ and the
symmetric component IQ of Q are deﬁned, respectively, by (xPQy , xQy and not yQx)
and (xIQy , xQy and yQx).
A social welfare ordering (SWO) in the sense of Bergson and Samelson is an ordering
R such that f(xQy ) xRy) and (xPQy ) (xRy and not yRx))g for all x;y 2 X. (In
words, an SWO is an ordering that preserves whatever information the Pareto unanimity
relation can tell us about the wishes of the individuals.) A social welfare function (SWF)
in the sense of Bergson and Samuelson is a numerical representation u of R : u(x) ¸
u(y) , xRy.
Our problem is to examine the existence of an SWO for a ﬁxed proﬁle. Thanks to the
work of Debreu [9] and others, we know that an SWO may not have an SWF representing
it. It may, however, be said that what is important is an SWO but not its numerical
representation.
Suppose that R1;:::;Rn are orderings. In this case Q is a quasi-ordering, so that a
corollary of Szpilrajn’s theorem (Fishburn [10, Lemma 15.4]) assures us of the existence
of an SWO corresponding to the given proﬁle. How about the case where Ri (i 2 N) is
not necessarily transitive? Generally speaking, we cannot have an SWO in this case, as
the following examples where n = 3 and X = fx;y;zg exhibit.
xI1y;yI1z;zP1x xP1y;yI1z;zI1x
(A) yI2z;zI2x;xP2y (B) yI2z;zI2x;xP2y
24zI3x;xI3y;yP3z zI3x;xI3y;yP3z
(Notice here that in both proﬁles individual strict preference is transitive but individual
indiﬀerence is not.) In the case (A), we have xPQy;yPQz and zPQx, so that Q is cyclic and
there exists no ordering which can subsume this Q. In the case (B), we have xPQy;yPQz
and xIQz. Although this Q is acyclic, we cannot still have an ordering subsuming it.
Under what condition can Q have an ordering which subsumes it?
Our answer will be given via a general theorem on the extension of a binary relation.
Let R be a given binary relation. A t-tuple of alternatives (x1;x2;:::;xt) is called a PR-
cycle of order t if we have x1Px2R:::RxtRx1, where P is the asymmetric component of
R. We say that R is consistent if there exists no PR-cycle of any ﬁnite order. It is clear
that a consistent binary relation is acyclic but not vice versa. An ordering R¤ is said to
be an extended ordering of R if f(xRy ) xR¤y) and (xPy ) xP ¤y)g for all x;y 2 X,
where P ¤ is the asymmetric component of R¤. We can now state a theorem on the
existence of extended ordering.
Theorem 3. A binary relation R has an extended ordering R¤ if and only if R is
consistent.
In passing we note that Champernowne [7] introduced a concept of consistent pref-
erence (or probability) relations which is similar to but distinct from ours. We say
that a t-tuple (x1;x2;:::;xt) is a C-cycle of order t if x1(P [ N)x2R:::RxtRx1, where
fx1(P [ N)x2 , (x1Px2 or x1Nx2)g;fx1Nx2 , (not x1Rx2 and not x2Rx1)g. R is said
to be Champernowne-consistent if there exists no C-cycle of any ﬁnite order. Unfor-
tunately it turns out that R is Champernowne-consistent if and only if it is transitive.
Clearly we have only to show that Champernowne consistency implies transitivity. Sup-
pose that R is not transitive. Then we have xRy;yRz but not xRz for some x;y;z 2 X.
Therefore we have z(P [ N)xRyRz, so that (z;x;y) is a C-cycle of order 3. In order to
show that our concept of consistency does not reduce to transitivity, we give an example.
Let X = fx;y;zg and let R be deﬁned by xPy;yRz and xNz.
It follows from Theorem 3 that a social welfare ordering exists for a proﬁle (R1;:::;Rn)
if and only if the Pareto unanimity relation Q corresponding to this proﬁle is consistent.
In this context, it is worth our while to note that the transitivity of an Ri implies that
of strict preference Pi and of indiﬀerence Ii, and cases against transitive indiﬀerence
are plenty. This being the case, it is interesting to see that we can deﬁne an SWO
corresponding to a proﬁle (R1;:::;Rn) even if Ri is not necessarily transitive so far as Q
satisﬁes the axiom of consistency. The contrast between the variable proﬁle framework
of the Arrow-Sen theory, which leads us to the logical impossibility even under weakened
rationality requirement, and the ﬁxed proﬁle framework of the Bergson-Samuelson theory,
which can even accommodate some individual preference intransitivity, is made sharper
than ever.
255 Proofs
Proof of the Implication Diagram
First, we show that (C) implies (FARP). Let x and y be such that C(fx;yg) = fxg
and take a superset S 2 K of fx;yg. By virtue of (C), we have fx;yg\C(S) ½ C(fx;yg),
so that y = 2 C(S).
Second, we show that (FARP) implies (BTA). If (BTA) is not satisﬁed by C, there
exist x;y and z in X such that C(fx;yg) = fxg, C(fy;zg) = fyg and C(fx;zg) = fzg.
Suppose that C satisﬁes (FARP). Then x does not belong to C(fx;y;zg), because fzg =
C(fx;zg). Similarly, neither y nor z belong to C(fx;y;zg). Thus C(fx;y;zg) = ;, a
contradiction. Therefore (FARP) implies (BTA).
Third, it will be shown that (B) implies (SARP). If C does not satisfy (SARP), there
exist x;y 2 X and S 2 K such that C(fx;yg) = fxg, x 2 S n C(S) and y 2 C(S). Let
S0 = fx;yg. Then S0 ½ S, S0 \ C(S) 6= ;, but x = 2 S0 \ C(S) and x 2 C(S0), so that (B)
does not hold. Therefore, (B) implies (SARP).
In order to show that a single-headed arrow in the diagram cannot in general be
reversed, we put forward the following examples.
Example 1. X = fx;y;zg;K = fS1; :::;S7g;S1 = fxg;S2 = fyg;S3 = fzg;S4 =
fx;yg;S5 = fy;zg;S6 = fx;zg;S7 = X;C(St) = St (t = 1;2;3);C(S4) = S1;C(S5) =
S2;C(S6) = S3 and C(S7) = S7:
Example 2. The same as Example 1 except for C(S6) = S6 and C(S7) = S2.
Example 3. The same as Example 1 except for C(S6) = S6 and C(S7) = S1.
Example 4. The same as Example 1 except for C(S6) = S1.
Example 5. The same as Example 1 except for C(S4) = S4, C(S5) = S5 and C(S6) = S6
and C(S7) = S1.
Example 6. X = fw;x;y;zg;K = fS1;:::;S15g;S1 = fxg;S2 = fyg;S3 = fzg;S4 =
fwg;S5 = fw;xg;S6 = fw;yg;S7 = fw;zg;S8 = fx;yg;S9 = fx;zg;S10 =
fy;zg;S11 = fw;x;yg;S12 = fw;x;zg;S13 = fw;y;zg;S14 = fx;y;zg;S15 =
X;C(St) = St (t = 1; :::;10);C(S11) = S8;C(S12) = S1;C(S13) = S2;C(S14) = S1
and C(S15) = S2.
The choice function in Example 1 satisﬁes (SARP) but not (FARP), so that (SARP) does
not necessarily imply (FARP). The choice function in Example 2 satisﬁes (BTA) but not
(FARP), so that (BTA) does not imply (FARP) in general. (Incidentally, Example 1
gives a choice function which satisﬁes (SARP) but not (BTA), while the choice function
in Example 2 satisﬁes (BTA) but not (SARP). It follows, therefore, that (SARP) and
(BTA) are generally independent.) The choice function in Example 3 satisﬁes (R) without
satisfying (RR), so that (R) does not imply (RR). This choice function does not satisfy
(B), so that (R) does not imply (B). The choice function in Example 4 satisﬁes (B) but
not (R), so that a fortiori it does not satisfy (RR). Thus (RR) is not implied by (B).
26The choice function given by Example 5 satisﬁes (C) without satisfying (R), so that (C)
does not necessarily imply (R). It can be seen that the choice function in Example 6
satisﬁes (FARP) but not (C), neither does it satisfy (WARP). Therefore, (FARP) does
not imply (C) in general, neither does (FARP) imply (WARP). Finally we note that the
choice function in Example 6 satisﬁes (SARP) but not (B), so that (SARP) does not
imply (B) in general. Q. E. D.
Proof of Theorem 1. It has been shown by Blair et al. [5] that, if n ¸ 4, there exists
no CCR which satisﬁes (U), (BTA), (P), (I), (WD) and (PR) (see also Sen [23]). Our
implication diagram shows that (FARP) is a stronger requirement on CCR than (BTA),
so that a fortiori it is incompatible with (U), (P), (I), (WD) and (PR), establishing
Theorem 1. Q. E. D.




n=1 is then deﬁned recursively by R
(1)




S = f(x;y) :
(x;z) 2 R and (z;y) 2 R
(n¡1)
S for some z 2 Sg (n ¸ 2). The transitive closure of R
relative to S is a binary relation which is deﬁned by T(RjS) = [1
n=1R
(n)
S . For simplicity
we let T(R) = T(RjX).
Proof of Theorem 2. For any proﬁle (R1;:::;Rn), let N(xRiy) be the number of
individuals who regard x to be at least as good as y. We deﬁne an R by [xRy ,
N(xRiy) ¸ N(yRix)] for all x;y 2 X and deﬁne a CCR F by associating a choice
function C(S) = GT(RjS)(S) with (R1;:::;Rn). It is easy to verify that this CCR satisﬁes
(U), (B), (P), (I), (WD) and (PR) (see Bordes [6]). Our implication diagram shows that
(SARP) is a weaker requirement on CCR than (B), so that a fortiori it is compatible
with the requirements (U), (P), (I), (WD) and (PR). Hence Theorem 2. Q. E. D.
Proof of Theorem 3. (a) Necessity proof. Suppose that R has an extended ordering
R¤. Let t be any ﬁnite positive integer and suppose that we have x1Px2R:::Rxt for
some x1;x2;:::;xt in X. Then we have x1P ¤x2R¤ :::R¤xt, which yields x1P ¤xt, thanks
to the transitivity of R¤. Thus we have (not xtR¤x1), which implies (not xtRx1). It
follows that if R has an extended ordering, it has to be consistent.
(b) Suﬃciency proof . Let the identity ¢ be deﬁned by ¢ = f(x;x) : x 2 Xg. We
deﬁne a binary relation Q by
(4) Q = ¢ [ T(R):
We show that Q is a quasi-ordering. Reﬂexivity is obvious. In order to show its tran-
sitivity, let (x;y);(y;z) 2 Q. If (x;y);(y;z) 2 T(R), we have (x;z) 2 T(R) ½ Q. If
(x;y) 2 ¢ (resp. (y;z) 2 ¢), we have x = y (resp. y = z), so that (x;z) 2 Q follows
from (y;z) 2 Q (resp. (x;y) 2 Q). Q being a quasi-ordering, it has an extension that
is an ordering (see, for example, Fishburn [10, Lemma 15.4]). If we can show that Q is
an extension of R, we are home. For that purpose, we have to show that R is included
in Q and P in PQ (asymmetric component of Q). The former is obvious. To prove the
latter, assume (x;y) 2 P, which means (x;y) 2 R and (y;x) = 2 R. From (x;y) 2 R it
27follows that (x;y) 2 Q, so that we have only to prove that (y;x) = 2 Q. Assume, therefore,
that (y;x) 2 Q. Clearly (y;x) = 2 ¢, otherwise we cannot have (x;y) 2 P. It follows
that (y;x) 2 T(R). When (x;y) 2 P is added to this, we obtain a PR-cycle, and this
contradiction proves the theorem. Q. E. D.
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30Chapter 11
Paretian Welfare Judgements and
Bergsonian Social Choice¤
In the wake of a harsh ordinalist criticism in the 1930s against the epistemological basis of
the ‘old’ welfare economics created by Pigou, several attempts were made to salvage the
wreckage of Pigou’s research agenda by reformulating welfare economics altogether on
the basis of ordinal and interpersonally non-comparable welfare information and nothing
else. The seminal concept of the Pareto principle to the eﬀect that a change from a
state x to another state y can be construed as socially good if at least one individual
is made better oﬀ without making anybody else worse oﬀ in return came to the fore,
and the characterisation and implementation of the Pareto eﬃcient resource allocations
became the central exercise in the “new” welfare economics. However, since almost every
economic policy cannot but favour some individuals at the cost of disfavouring others,
there will be almost no situation of real importance where the Pareto principle can claim
direct relevance.
Two distinct approaches were explored to rectify this unsatisfactory state of welfare
economics. The ﬁrst approach was the introduction of compensation criteria by Kaldor
[12], Hicks [11], Scitovsky [19] and Samuelson [18], which endeavoured to expand the
applicability of the Pareto principle by introducing hypothetical compensation payments
between gainers and losers. According to Graaﬀ [8, pp.84-85], “[t]he compensation tests
all spring from a desire to see what can be said about social welfare or ‘real national
income’... without making interpersonal comparisons of well-being ... . They have com-
¤First published in Economic Journal, Vol.109, 1999, pp.204-220. Reprinted in Wood, J. C. and
M. McLure, eds., Paul A. Samuelson: Critical Assessments of Contemporary Economists, 2nd Series,
London: Routledge, 2004, pp.378-396. This chapter capitalises on Suzumura [29], and generalises the
main theorem that ﬁrst appeared there. The basic idea was presented at the Fourth Osnabr¨ uck Seminar
on Individual Decisions and Social Choice held at the University of Osnabr¨ uck, September 14, 1996, the
Research Seminar at the Institute for Social and Economic Research held at Osaka University, January
22, 1997, the Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society held at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong, July 24-6, 1997, and the Fourth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
held at the University of British Colombia, July 3-6, 1998. I am grateful to Professors Nick Baigent,
David Donaldson, Wulf Gaertner, Philippe Mongin, Prasanta Pattanaik, Koichi Tadenuma, Yongsheng
Xu, and Akira Yamazaki for their helpful comments and discussions at several stages of the evolution of
this chapter. Last but surely not least, my sincere thanks go to the editor in charge, Professor Timothy
Besley, and the two referees of Economic Journal for their helpful comments and suggestions. Needless
to say, I am solely, responsible for any remaining defects of this chapter.
31mon origin in Pareto’s deﬁnition of an increase in social welfare — that at least one man
must be better oﬀ and no one worse oﬀ — but they are extended to situations in which
some people are made worse oﬀ.” The second attempt was the introduction of the novel
concept of a social welfare function by Bergson [3] and Samuelson [17, Chapter 8], which
is rooted in the belief that the analysis of the logical consequences of any value judge-
ments, irrespective of whose ethical beliefs they represent, whether or not they are widely
shared in the society, or how they are generated in the ﬁrst place, is a legitimate task
of welfare economics. The social welfare function is nothing other than the formal way
of characterising such an ethical belief which is rational in the sense of being complete
as well as transitive over the alternative states of aﬀairs. A Paretian (or individualistic)
social welfare function is one which judges in concordance with the Pareto principle if the
latter does have relevance. It was Arrow [1, p. 108] who neatly crystallised the gist of this
approach as follows: “[T]he ‘new welfare economics’ says nothing about choices among
Pareto-optimal alternatives. The purpose of the social welfare function was precisely to
extend the unanimity quasi-ordering to a full social ordering.”
Capitalising on Graaﬀ’s and Arrow’s insightful observations on the nature and sig-
niﬁcance of these two schools of thought, where the concept of an extension of the
Pareto quasi-ordering plays a crucial role in common, this chapter examines the logical
performance of the new welfare economics. To be more precise, we synthesise the two
approaches to the new welfare economics and identify a condition under which the new
welfare economics is logically impeccable. The usefulness of our condition is two-fold.
In the ﬁrst place, we may thereby check whether or not the hypothetical compensation
criteria proposed by Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky and Samuelson can serve as a useful pre-
liminary step towards ﬁnal rational social choice. In the second place, we can thereby
cast a new light on some recent attempts to deﬁne several plausible quasi-orderings on
social welfare including Suppes [23], Sen [20; 21], Fine [7], Blackorby and Donaldson [4]
and Madden [15] vis-` a-vis the analytical scenario of the new welfare economics.
It is hoped that the preceding attempts in the new welfare economics along vari-
ous routes can be systematically understood and neatly evaluated with reference to our
analysis in this chapter.
1 Motivation and Illustration
To motivate our analysis intuitively, and to illustrate the nature of our central theorem
neatly, let us begin by examining a situation where a policy-maker should make demo-
cratic collective decisions by paying due respect for opinions expressed by citizens. For
simplicity, suppose that there are only two citizens, say 1 and 2, and only three options,
say, x, y and z. Citizens are free to express their preference orderings on X = fx;y;zg.
Without loss of generality, assume that citizens can express strict preferences only. Then
there are six logically possible preference orderings, say ®, ¯, °, ±, ² and ³ on X, which
may possibly be expressed.
Figure 1 describes these possible preference orderings, where options are arranged
vertically with the more preferred options being located above the less preferred ones.
32For example, ® is one of the preference orderings, according to which x is preferred to y, y
is preferred to z, hence x is preferred to z. Arranging these possible preference orderings
vertically and horizontally, we may construct a box in Figure 2 with 36 cells, where the
vertical (resp. horizontal) list refers to citizen 1’s (resp. citizen 2’s) expressed preference
orderings. Clearly, each and every cell in Figure 2 represents a proﬁle of the two citizens’
expressed preference orderings. For example, the cell (®;¯) represents a proﬁle in which
citizen 1 expresses ® and citizen 2 expresses ¯.
What we call a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering is nothing other than
a preference ordering from the society’s viewpoint speciﬁed for each and every cell in
Figure 2 which guides the rational collective decision to be made by the policy-maker.
A Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering is Paretian or individualistic if it accepts
everything that the Pareto principle tells us about the social desirability of one option
vis-` a-vis the other. For simplicity, we will refer to “what the Pareto principle tells us
about the social desirability of one option vis-` a-vis the other” collectively as the Paretian
welfare judgements. To be democratic, it is minimally required that the policy-maker is
ready to accept the Paretian welfare judgements.
® ¯ ° ± ² ³
x x y y z z
y z x z x y
z y z x y x
Figure 1. Possible Preference Orderings
To what extent do the Paretian welfare judgements restrict the admissible class of
Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare orderings to be ﬁlled in each and every cell?
Clearly the answer hinges squarely on the extent to which the two citizens agree on
their individual preference orderings. Note that there are six cells (®;®), (¯;¯), (°;°),
(±;±);(²;²) and (³;³), along the main diagonal in Figure 2, where the two citizens express
exactly the same preference orderings ®, ¯, °, ±, ² and ³, respectively. Therefore, by virtue
of the Pareto principle and nothing else, the Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
ordering corresponding to these cells cannot but be ®, ¯, °, ±, ² and ³, respectively, so
that nothing is left for any other principle to bridge the Paretian welfare judgements to
the Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering. In all other cells in Figure 2,
the extent of interpersonal agreements of preferences among citizens is less than perfect.
However, there are two distinct categories to be identiﬁed and separately addressed. The
ﬁrst category consists of those cells where only one pair of options is left to be socially
ordered in order to bridge the Paretian welfare judgements to the Paretian Bergson-
Samuelson social welfare ordering, whereas the second category consists of those cells
where at least two pairs of options are left to be socially ordered before the Paretian
33welfare judgements can be completed into the Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
ordering.












































Figure 2. Implications of the Pareto Principle
Take, for example, the cell (®;¯), where the Pareto principle is enough to tell us that
xPy and xPz, that is to say, the policy-maker must accept that x is socially preferred to
both y and z. Only one pair of options, viz. fy;zg, is left to be socially ordered before
we arrive at a fully-ﬂedged Paretian Bergson-Samueslon social welfare ordering, so that
this cell is of the ﬁrst category. If y (resp. z) is judged somehow socially better than z
(resp. y) in this cell, then we have xPy, yPz and xPz, (resp. xPz, zPy and xPy), so
that the Paretian Bergson-Samueslon social welfare ordering to be ﬁlled in this cell is
uniquely determined to be ® (resp. ¯). It is clear that the cells in Figure 2 which compose
the ﬁrst category consist of (®;¯), (®;°), (¯;®), (¯;²), (°;®), (°;±), (±;°), (±;³), (²;¯),
34(²;³), (³;±) and (³;²). By deﬁnition, the step of deleting the residual indeterminacy in
the cells of the ﬁrst category is in fact nothing other than the ﬁnal step rather than
the preliminary step in the transition from the Paretian welfare judgements to the fully-
ﬂedged Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering. Since the asserted raison
d’ˆ etre of the new welfare economics lies in its preliminary role in expanding the Pareto
principle in the presence of conﬂict of judgements among citizens without using anything
that goes beyond intrapersonally ordinal and interpersonally non-comparable information
on well-being, we will focus mostly on the cells (proﬁles) of the second category.1
Consider the cell (®;±) which is clearly of the second category. Since the Pareto
principle tells us that yPz and nothing else in this cell, the feasible candidates for the
Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering in this cell are limited to ®;° and
±. Without loss of generality, suppose that ® is the relevant social welfare ordering
in this cell, and consider the set of partial welfare judgements which not only strictly
extend the Paretian welfare judgements, but also are strictly subsumed in the Paretian
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering ®. It is easy to check that two partial welfare
judgements exist, which satisfy these two requirements, viz. (i) Q1, which says that y is
socially better than z and x is socially better than z, and (ii) Q2, which says that x is
socially better than y and y is socially better than z. Note that, according to Q1, the
policy-maker should not choose z, as it is dominated by x as well as by y in terms of
social welfare. Likewise, according to Q2, the policy-maker should choose neither y nor z,
as they are both dominated by x in terms of social welfare. It then follows that there is
only one option in the sex X = fx;y;zg of all alternatives, viz. x, which is not excluded
by any one of the two partial welfare judgements Q1 and Q2. As a matter of fact, this
social choice of x is in full concordance with the choice according to the optimisation of
the Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering ®.
This remarkable result is not an accidental outcome of our fortuitous choice of a cell
of the second category, viz. (®;±), neither is it due to our cunning choice of a particular
Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering ®. Indeed, what our main theorem
guarantees is that this property is in fact a robust result which holds for all proﬁles of
citizens’ preference orderings of the second category in a society with arbitrary number
of citizens and options.
It is also important to realise the implication of this result. It suggests unambiguously
that the research programme of the new welfare economics is logically impeccable in the
following sense: For each and every Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering
R, the social choice set from any opportunity set S in accordance with the optimisation of
this R over S can be recovered by ﬁnding the undominated subsets of S for each and every
partial preference relation, which is a strict sub-relation of R as well as a strict extension
of the Paretian welfare judgements, and taking the intersection of these undominated
subsets. Thus, the preliminary step advocated by the new welfare economics serves us
1The proportion occupied by cells of the second category over the total number of cells is 18=36 = 0:5
in the situation with two citizens and three options, where citizens are allowed to express strict preference
orderings only. It is easy, if tedious, to verify that this proportion increases to 120=169 ¼ 0:71 when two
citizens are allowed to express occasional indiﬀerence among three options. For societies with more than
two citizens and more than three options, this proportion will surely increase even further.
35well in locating the rational choice exactly in terms of the Paretian Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare ordering. In other words, the new welfare economics can indeed help the
policy-maker to identify the rational social choice, at least in principle.
So much for the motivation and implication of our subsequent analysis. Let us now
proceed to the proper analysis in a general setting.
2 Maximal Set, Greatest Set and Extensions of a
Binary Relation
To facilitate our analysis for a society with arbitrary number of individuals and alter-
natives, let us summarise some basic properties of binary relations, maximal sets and
greatest sets and present an extension theorem for consistent binary relations, which will
play a crucial role in what follows.
Let X be the universal set of alternatives. A binary relation on X is a subset R of
X £ X. It is customary to write, for all x;y 2 X, xRy if and only if (x;y) 2 R. When
a binary relation R satisﬁes completeness (For all x;y 2 X;x 6= y implies f(x;y) 2 R
or (y;x) 2 Rg), reﬂexivity (For all x 2 X;(x;x) 2 R) and transitivity (For all x;y;z 2
X;f(x;y) 2 R & (y;z) 2 Rg implies (x;z) 2 R), we say that R is an ordering on X. If
R satisﬁes reﬂexivity and transitivity, but not necessarily completeness, we say that R is
a quasi-ordering.
For any binary relation R on X, let P(R) and I(R) denote, respectively, the asym-
metric part of R and the symmetric part of R, which are deﬁned by P(R) = f(x;y) 2
X £X j (x;y) 2 R & (y;x) = 2 Rg and I(R) = f(x;y) 2 X £X j (x;y) 2 R & (y;x) 2 Rg.
If R stands for an agent’s preference relation over the set X of options, where xRy for
some x;y 2 X means that this agent judges x to be at least as good as y;P(R) and I(R)
stand, respectively, for his/her strict preference relation and indiﬀerence relation. If R
is transitive, P(R) as well as I(R) satisﬁes transitivity.
For any binary relation R and any non-empty subset S of X, an element x 2 S is
an R-maximal element of S if (y;x) = 2 P(R) holds for all y 2 S. The set of all R-
maximal elements of S is the R-maximal set of S, to be denoted by M(S;R). Likewise,
an element x 2 S is an R-greatest element of S if (x;y) 2 R holds for all y 2 S. The set
of all R-greatest elements of S is the R-greatest set of S, to be denoted by G(S;R). The
best known example of the R-maximal set M(S;R) may be the set of Pareto eﬃcient
allocations, where S stands for the set of all feasible allocations and R stands for the
unanimity quasi-ordering such that (x;y) 2 R holds if and only if everybody in the
society regards x to be at least as good as y. The best known example of the R-greatest
set G(S;R) may be the demand correspondence of a consumer, where S denotes his/her
budget set and R denotes his/her preference ordering.
The following lemma, which is a straightforward consequence of the deﬁnitions of a
maximal set and a greatest set, will prove useful in our analysis. A formal proof of this
lemma is available in Sen [20, Chapter 1¤] if necessary. See also Sen [22] and Suzumura
[27, Chapter 2].
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(a) G(S;R) ½ M(S;R) holds for all (S;R).
(b) G(S;R) = M(S;R) holds for all (S;R) such that R is complete.
A choice function C on a family K of non-empty subsets of X maps each and every
S 2 K into a non-empty subset C(S) of S, which is called the choice set from the
opportunity set S. A choice function C on K is rational if and only if there exists
an underlying preference ordering R, to be called the rationalisation of C, such that
C(S) = G(S;R) holds for all S 2 K. Thus, a rational choice is a choice in accordance
with the optimisation of an underlying preference ordering.2.
For any binary relation R on X, a binary relation R¤ on X is called an extension of
R if and only if R ½ R¤ and P(R) ½ P(R¤). Thus, an extension R¤ of R retains all the
information that R already contains, and goes possibly further. Note, in particular, that
the asymmetric part P(R) of R must be subsumed in the asymmetric part of R¤. When
R¤ is an extension of R, R is in turn called a sub-relation of R¤.
Let Σ(R) denote the set of all sub-relations of R. Then we have the following simple
properties of the maximal sets and the greatest sets:
Lemma 2
If Q 2 Σ(R), then M(S;R) ½ M(S;Q) and G(S;Q) ½ G(S;R).
Proof : Obvious from the respective deﬁnitions of a maximal set, a greatest set and
an extension of a binary relation. k
Under what conditions can there be an extension of a binary relation that satisﬁes
the axioms of an ordering? As an auxiliary step in answering this crucial question of the
existence of an ordering extension, we introduce the following two weaker versions of the
transitivity axiom.
First, a binary relation R is acyclic if and only if there exists no ﬁnite subset
fx1;x2;:::;xtg of X, where 2 · t < +1, such that (x1;x2) 2 P(R);(x2;x3) 2 P(R);:::;
(xt;x1) 2 P(R). Second, a binary relation R is consistent if and only if there exists no ﬁ-
nite subset fx1;x2;:::;xtg of X, where 2 · t < +1, such that (x1;x2) 2 P(R);(x2;x3) 2
R;:::;(xt;x1) 2 R. It is clear that transitivity of R implies consistency thereof, while
consistency of R implies acyclicity thereof. The converse of each one of these implications




2In the general theory of rational choice functions, a choice function is called rational if an underlying
preference relation exists irrespective of whether the preference relation in question satisﬁes the axioms
of an ordering. A rational choice function whose underlying preference relation satisﬁes the axioms of an
ordering is called a fully rational choice function. See, for example, Suzumura [24; 27, Chapter 2]. Since
we are concerned in this chapter only with a choice function which is rationalised by a Paretian Bergson-
Samuelson social welfare ordering, however, we can do without introducing the concept of degrees of
rationality altogether.
37it is clear that R1 is consistent but not transitive, whereas R2 is acyclic but not consistent.
If R is complete, however, R is consistent if and only if it is transitive.
We are now ready to state the following basic extension theorem.
Lemma 3 (Suzumura [24, Theorem 3; 27, Theorem A(5)]3
A binary relation R has an ordering extension if and only if it is consistent.
Let Ω(X) stand for the set of all reﬂexive and consistent binary relations on X. It
is clear that Σ(R) ½ Ω(X) holds for any ordering R on X by virtue of Lemma 3. It is
also clear that R 2 Σ(R) holds for any binary relation R, viz. any binary relation R is
an extension of itself. Noting this fact, we call a binary relation Q 2 Σ(R)nfRg a strict
sub-relation of R. R is then called a strict extension of Q.
So much for purely technical preliminaries. Let us now formally introduce our social
choice problem.
3 The Pareto Quasi-Ordering and Bergson-Samuelson
Social Welfare Orderings
Let X := fx;y;z;:::g and N := f1;2;:::;ng be the set of all social states and the set
of all individuals in the society, where 3 · #X and 2 · n := #N < +1.4 A social
state means a complete description of economic, social and all other features of the world
which may possibly inﬂuence the well-being of individuals.
Each individual i 2 N is assumed to have a weak preference (“at least as good as”)
relation Ri on X, which satisﬁes the axioms of an ordering on X, such that xRiy holds
if and only if x is judged by i to be at least as good as y. By deﬁnition, P(Ri) and I(Ri)
stand for i’s strict preference relation and his/her indiﬀerence relation, respectively.
Given a list of individual preference ordering R
N = (R1;R2;:::;Rn), to be called a
proﬁle for short, we deﬁne the Pareto quasi-ordering ½(R
N) by
½(R
N) = \Ri over all i 2 N:5 (1)
By deﬁnition, (x;y) 2 ½(R
N) if and only if xRiy for all i 2 N, whereas (x;y) 2 P(½(R
N))
if and only if xRiy for all i 2 N, and xP(Ri)y for at least one i 2 N. Within this
conceptual framework, the problem confronted by the two schools of the new welfare
economics may be neatly formulated as follows.
Recollect that the compensation criteria were designed to extend the applicability
of the Pareto principle through hypothetical compensatory payments between gainers
3Since transitivity is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for consistency, this theorem is in fact a
generalisation of the classical theorem to Szpilrajn [30]. See also Arrow [1, p.64] and Sen [20, Chapter
1¤] for the role and importance of the extension theorems.
4For each set A, #A stands for the number of elements in A.
5Ri being an ordering for every i 2 N;½(R
N) satisﬁes reﬂexivity and transitivity, which is why ½(R
N)
is called the Pareto quasi-ordering.
38and losers. Let Q denote the generic binary relation representing the partial welfare
judgements thus deﬁned. The ﬁrst task for this school of thought is to ensure that Q is a
strict extension of ½(R
N), viz. ½(R
N) 2 Σ(Q)nfQg, since this school intends to go beyond
the Pareto principle without losing what the latter principle already informs us of social
welfare. But this is only half of the full story. Since the compensation criteria provide only
a preliminary step towards ﬁnal social choice, which should be rationalised by a Paretian
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering, the mission will be left unaccomplished if
what is meant to be a preliminary step turns out to preclude the possibility of ﬁnal
rational social choice. In other words, for the success of the compensationist school of
thought, it is necessary that Q should be a strict sub-relation of at least one Paretian
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering R so that we have Q 2 Σ(R)nfRg.
We have thus identiﬁed the research programme of the new welfare economics as that
of deﬁning a principle of compensation between gainers and losers so as to generate partial
welfare judgements Q such that (i) ½(R
N) 2 Σ(Q)nfQg, and (ii) Q 2 Σ(R)nfRg for some
Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering R. It follows from this observation
and Lemma 3 that this research programme will be vacuous unless Q is guaranteed to
be consistent. This is a useful remark, as it enables us to check whether the promise of
the compensationist new welfare economics can be logically fulﬁlled.
4 The Recoverability Theorem
The research programme of the new welfare economics can be located in a wider per-
spective with fruitful implications. Let R be a Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
ordering corresponding to a given proﬁle R
N = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) of individual preference
orderings. Let Θ(R
N;R) stand for the set of all partial welfare judgements, to be called
the test relations for short,6 which are strict extension of ½(R
N) as well as strict sub-
relation of R:
Θ(R
N;R) := fQ ½ X £ X j ½(R
N) 2 Σ(Q)nfQg & Q 2 Σ(R)nfRgg: (2)
It is worthwhile to repeat why we should exclude ½(R
N) and R from the set Θ(R
N;R).
The reason is squarely rooted in the very nature of the new welfare economics. Recollect
that the research programme of this school of welfare economics is to go beyond the Pareto
principle and to provide a preliminary step towards the Paretian Bergson-Samuelson
social welfare ordering that rationalises the ﬁnal social choice. Thus, ½(R
N) as well as R
cannot possibly qualify as the test relations in our analytical scenario, as ½(R
N) (resp.
R) does not in fact go beyond the Pareto quasi-ordering (resp. is not in fact a preliminary
step in locating R).
At this juncture of our analysis, it is useful to observe that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
may assert that
G(S;R) = M(S;R) ½ M(S;Q) (3)
6This convenient terminology was suggested to me by one of the referees of Economic Journal.
39holds for any S 2 K and Q 2 Θ(R
N;R), So that we may assert that
8S 2 K : C(S) := G(S;R) ½ \M(S;Q) over all Q 2 Θ(R
N;R); (4)
holds, where C is the social choice function on K, which is rationalised by the Paretian
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering R. Thus, by deﬁning the intersection of all
the maximal sets with respect to each and every test relation Q 2 Θ(R
N;R), we can
locate the area from which the ﬁnal rational social choice in accordance with the Paretian
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering cannot escape.
Going one step further, suppose that (4) can be strengthened into the following set-
theoretic equality:
8S 2 K : C(S) := G(S;R) = \M(S;Q) over all Q 2 Θ(R
N;R): (5)
According to (5), the social choice function C, which is rationalisable by the Paretian
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering R, can be exactly recovered by the maximisa-
tion of each and every test relation Q 2 Θ(R
N;R). Therefore, it makes sense to assert
that the search for the test relations that are strict extensions of the Pareto quasi-ordering
½(R
N) as well as strict sub-relations of the Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
ordering R is a legitimate and eﬀective preliminary step for ﬁnal rational social choice
if and only if (5) holds true. It is in this sense that the search for the conditions under
which (5) holds true is of crucial importance for the logical completeness of the new
welfare economies.
To orient our analysis, consider the following example:
Example 1: Suppose that X = fx;y;zg and R
N = (R1;R2) are such that R1 =
¢(X) [ f(x;y);(y;z);(x;z)g and R2 = ¢(X) [ f(y;x);(x;z);(y;z)g, where ¢(X) :=
f(x;x);(y;y);(z;z)g, denotes the diagonal binary relation on X. Let the Paretian Bergson-
Samuelson social welfare ordering be given by R = ¢(X) [ f(x;y);(y;z);(x;z)g. In this
situation, we have ½(R
N) = ¢(X)[f(y;z);(x;z)g and there exists no binary relation Q
that satisﬁes ½(R
N) 2 Σ(Q)nfQg and Q 2 Σ(R)nfRg. Thus, we have Θ(R
N;R) = ?
for this R
N and R. k
The message of this example is simple. If the degree of interpersonal diﬀerence of
preferences is small enough as in Example 1, it may turn out that Θ(R
N;R) is empty for
the given proﬁle R
N of individual preference orderings and the given Paretian Bergson-
Samuelson social preference ordering R. It is to conﬁne ourselves to the interesting
situations that we introduce the following assumption of non-triviality:
Assumption NT
Θ(R
N;R) is non-empty for the given proﬁle R
N = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) of individual prefer-
ence orderings and the given Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering R.
Mild and innocuous though the assumption NT may look, it enables us to prove the
following recoverability theorem:
40Recoverability Theorem
For any given proﬁle R
N = (R1;R2;:::;Rn) of individual preference orderings, the ra-
tional social choice in accordance with the speciﬁed Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social
welfare ordering R can be fully recovered by ﬁnding the maximal set for each and every
test relation Q 2 Θ(R
N;R) and taking the intersection of these maximal sets if and only
if the assumption NT is satisﬁed.
It should be clear that the Recoverability Theorem veriﬁes the general validity of what
we have illustrated in Section 2 in terms of a simple case of two citizens and three options,
and for the proﬁle of citizens’ preference orderings of the second category. Clearly, it also
suﬃces to establish the logical completeness of the research programme of the new welfare
economics. Since the proof of the Recoverability Theorem is slightly involved, it will be
relegated into Section 5, which may be neglected by those who are not interested in minor
technicalities.
There may be some readers who are interested in knowing whether or not a stronger
version of the recoverability property holds. Let Ω¤(X) be the set of all quasi-orderings







By construction, Q 2 Θ¤(R
N;R) holds if and only if (i) Q is a quasi-ordering on X,
(ii) Q is a strict extension of the Pareto quasi-ordering ½(R
N), and (iii) Q is a strict
sub-relation of R. Since it is clear that Θ¤(R
N;R) ½ Θ(R
N;R) holds, we may assert
that
8S 2 K : C(S) := G(S;R) ½ \M(S;R) over all Q 2 Θ(R
N;R)
½ \M(S;R) over all Q 2 Θ¤(R
N;R) (7)
holds. Thus, if we could prove that the recoverability of C(S) in terms of Θ¤(R
N;R)
holds, viz.
8S 2 K : C(S) := G(S;R) = \M(S;Q) over all Q 2 Θ
¤(R
N;R) (8)
holds, it would follow from (7) that the recoverability of C(S) in terms of Θ(R
N;R)
must hold a fortiori. However, the recoverability property (8) is not true in general, as
we can easily check in terms of the Example 2 and Example 3 in Section 5. Plausible
and desirable though it may look, the recoverability of the Bergsonian social choice in
terms of the maximisation of each and every Paretian quasi-ordering is a target which is
unattainable in general.7
7This is not to deny the possibility that some necessary and suﬃcient conditions can be identiﬁed
for the recoverability property in terms of Θ¤(R
N;R) to hold. For example, if the set of Pareto non-
comparable pairs consists of only two pairs, we have succeeded in identifying the set of necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for the recoverability property in terms of Θ¤(R
N;R) to hold. Even in this simple
case, however, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions in question are fairly complicated, and the proof
of the recoverability property is rather involved.
415 Proof and Counter-Examples
5.1. Proof of the Recoverability Theorem
The ‘only if’ part being obviously true, we have only to prove the ‘if’ part by reductio ad
absurdum. Suppose to the contrary that there is an S 2 K and an x 2 \M(S;Q) over
all Q 2 Θ(R
N;R) such that x = 2 G(S;R), which means that
9z 2 S : (z;x) 2 P(R) (9)
and
8Q 2 Θ(R
N;R) : (z;x) = 2 P(Q); (10)
where use is made of the completeness of R. Thus:
8Q 2 Θ(R
N;R) : Q ½½ R and P(Q) ½½ P(R): (11)
There are two cases to be considered.
Case 1: Q0 [ f(z;x)g ½½ R for some Q0 2 Θ(R
N;R).
Case 2: Q [ f(z;x)g = R for all Q 2 Θ(R
N;R).
It should be clear that Case 2 implies that Θ(R
N;R) is in fact a singleton set, say
fQ¤g, where Q¤ [f(z;x)g = R. However, it follows from the deﬁnition of Θ(R
N;R) and
the assumption NT that there exist at least two distinct pairs, say fa;bg and fu;vg, such
that, if we denote the relation between a and b (resp. u and v) in accordance with R by
(a ¤ b) (resp. (u ¤ v)), Q1 = ½(R
N) [ f(a ¤ b)g and Q2 = ½(R
N) [ f(u ¤ v)g must both
belong to Θ(R
N;R), which is a contradiction.
Consider now Case 1 and deﬁne
Q
¤¤ = Q
0 [ f(z;x)g: (12)
Our task is to verify that Q¤¤ 2 Θ(R
N;R). Since Q¤¤ ½½ R holds by deﬁnition, we
have only to check that ½(R
N) 2 Σ(Q¤¤)nfQ¤¤g and Q¤¤ 2 Σ(R). Note that ½(R
N) 2
Σ(Q0)nfQ0g and (12) imply that ½(R
N) ½ Q0 ½½ Q¤¤. To show that P(½(R
N)) ½
P(Q¤¤), observe that (a;b) 2 P(Q¤¤) if and only if either
(a;b) = (z;x);(b;a) = 2 Q
0 and (b;a) 6= (z;x) (13)
or
(a;b) 2 P(Q
0) and (b;a) 6= (z;x) (14)
holds, where use is made of (12). Suppose (a;b) 2 P(½(R
N)). It follows from ½(R
N) 2
Σ(Q0) that (a;b) 2 P(Q0), which implies that (b;a) = 2 Q0. If it happens to be the case
that (a;b) = (z;x), then (b;a) = (x;z) 6= (z;x) holds, since otherwise (a;b) = (x;z) 2
P(Q0) ½ P(R) in contradiction with (z;x) 2 P(R). Thus (13) must be the case, hence
(a;b) 2 P(Q¤¤) obtains. On the other hand, if (a;b) 6= (z;x), then we cannot have
42(b;a) = (z;x), since otherwise (a;b) 2 P(½(R
N)) ½ P(Q0) will have to imply (x;z) 2
P(Q0) ½ P(R), a contradiction. Hence (14) must hold, so that ½(R
N) 2 Σ(Q¤¤)nfQ¤¤g.
To verify that Q¤¤ 2 Σ(R), note that Q0 2 Σ(R);(z;x) 2 P(R) and (12) imply
Q¤¤ ½ R. If (a;b) 2 P(Q¤¤), either (13) or (14) holds. If (13) is the case, (9) implies that
(a;b) 2 P(R). On the other hand, (14) and Q0 2 Σ(R) imply (a;b) 2 P(Q0) ½ P(R).
Thus Q¤¤ 2 Σ(R) must be true.
We have thus shown that Q¤¤ 2 Θ(R
N;R). However, since (z;x) 2 P(Q¤¤) by
deﬁnition, this contradicts (10) for this Q¤¤. Therefore, we obtain
8S 2 K : C(S) := G(S;R) ¾ \M(S;Q) over all Q 2 Θ(R
N;R); (15)
which completes the proof of (5) in view of (4). k
5.2. Counter-Examples
Example 2: Let S = X = fx;y;zg, N = f1;2g, and let a proﬁle R
N = (R1;R2)
of individual preference orderings be deﬁned by R1 = ¢(X) [ f(z;x);(x;y);(z;y)g and
R2 = ¢(X)[f(x;y);(y;z);(x;z)g. Clearly, the Pareto quasi-ordering is given in this case
by ½(R
N) = ¢(X) [ f(x;y)g. If a Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering
R is speciﬁed by R = ¢(X) [ f(z;x);(x;y);(z;y)g, Θ(R
N;R) consists of two relations
Q1 and Q2 such that Q1 = ½(R
N) [ f(z;y)g and Q2 = ½(R
N) [ f(z;x)g. It follows that
we have G(S;R) = fzg = M(S;Q1) \ M(S;Q2), vindicating the recoverability theorem
in terms of Θ(R
N;R). Note, however, that Θ¤(R
N;R) consists only of Q1, because Q2
will have to be expanded so as to include f(z;y)g in order for it to satisfy the axiom of
transitivity. However, doing this cannot but imply that the expanded Q2 must coincide
with R. Then we have G(S;R) = fzg ½½ fx;zg = M(S;Q1), so that the recoverability
property does not hold in terms of Θ¤(R
N;R). k
Example 3: Let S = X = fx;y;z;wg, N = f1;2g, and let a proﬁle R
N = (R1;R2) of
individual preference orderings be deﬁned by R1 = ¢(X)[f(x;w);(w;y);(y;z);(x;y);(x;
z);(w;z)g and R2 = ¢(X) [ f(w;x);(x;z);(z;y);(w;z);(w;y);(x;y)g. Clearly, the
Pareto quasi-ordering is given in this case by ½(R
N) = ¢(X) [ f(x;y);(w;y);(w;z)g.
If a Paretian Bergson-Samuelson social welfare ordering R is speciﬁed by R = ¢(X) [
f(w;z);(z;x);(x;y);(w;x);(w;y);(z;y)g, Θ¤(R
N;R) consists of the following three rela-
tions: Q1, Q2 and Q3 such that Q1 = ½(R
N) [ f(w;x)g and Q2 = ½(R
N) [ f(z;y)g and
Q3 = ½(R
N) [ f(w;x);(z;y)g, so that G(fx;zg;R) = fzg ½½ fx;zg = M(fx;zg;Q1) \




To assert the logical impeccability of the research programme of the new welfare eco-
nomics is one thing, and to assert the actual implementability of the logically impeccable
programme is quite another. This chapter was mainly concerned with accomplishing
43the ﬁrst task by establishing the recoverability of the Pareto-compatible Bergsonian so-
cial choice through the maximisation of the Pareto-inclusive test relations. However, we
could identify en route a condition to be satisﬁed by the eligible Pareto-inclusive test
relations. The condition in question is the logical requirement of consistency, which was
ﬁrst introduced by Suzumura [24; 27, pp. 8-11], and it enables us to check whether or not
various test relations proposed in the literature are capable of implementing the research










Figure 3. Inconsistency of the Kaldor, Hicks and Scitovsky Compensation Principles
Note: The curves depicted in this ﬁgure describe the utility possibility frontiers corresponding
to various situations. Note that, according to each of the Kaldor, Hicks and Scitovsky principles,
y is better than x, z is better than y, but x is better than z.
Take, for example, the hypothetical compensation principles proposed by Kaldor [12],
Hicks [11], Scitovsky [19] and Samuelson [18]. The condition of consistency alone is suﬃ-
cient to disqualify the Kaldor compensation principle, the Hicks compensation principle
and the Scitovsky compensation principle as workable guideposts for ﬁnal rational social
choice. Although the failure of these principles is well vindicated by Arrow [1, Chapter
IV], Chipman and Moore [6], Graaﬀ [8, Chapters IV and V] and Suzumura [26; 28; 29],
among others, the essence of their failure can be neatly illustrated in Figure 3.8 The three
8The piecemeal welfare criteria ` a la Little [13; 14] and Mishan [16], which pay due attention to dis-
tributional equity considerations along with allocative eﬃciency considerations, can improve the logical
score of the Kaldor-Hicks compensationist approach, but this progress is somewhat vacuous in the sense
that the crucial value judgements on distributional equity are left completely unspeciﬁed. See Arrow
[2, p.927], according to whom “[t]he hard problem ... arises at the point where Little and everyone else
stops. It is all very well to say that the eﬀects of a proposed change on income distribution must be
taken into account in deciding on the desirability of the change: but how do we describe a distribution of
real income? Admittedly, the choice between two income distributions is the result of a value judgement;
but how do we even formulate such judgement?” See also Chipman and Moore [6] and Suzumura [26;
29], among others, for critical examination of this line of thought.
44curves in this ﬁgure describe the utility possibility frontiers corresponding to three social
states x, y and z. According to each of the Kaldor, Hicks and Scitovsky compensation
principles, y is better than x, x is better than z, and z is better than y. Thus, these
principles generate a test relation which is not acyclic, hence not consistent, so that these









Figure 4. Incompatibility between the Pareto Principle and the Samuelson Compensation
Principle
Note: The curves depicted in this ﬁgure describe the utility possibility frontiers corresponding
to various situations. If the Samuelson compensation principle is an extension of the Pareto
principle x is judged socially better than y, y is judged socially better than z, z is judged
socially better than w, but w is judged socially better than x.
The verdict on the Samuelson compensation principle, which is deﬁned in terms of
a uniform outward shift of the utility possibility frontiers, is quite diﬀerent. Indeed,
the Samuelson principle can actually generate a test relation which is transitive, and
hence consistent, but it fails to deﬁne a strict extension of the Pareto quasi-ordering
in general.9 This failure is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows that the Samuelson
compensation principle may generate a test relation which cannot be compatible with
the Pareto principle.
How about many interesting proposals in the more recent literature, which tried to
construct some relevant Pareto-inclusive quasi-orderings? To cite just a few salient ex-
amples, the grading principle of justice ` a la Suppes [23] under the axiom of identity
introduced by Sen [20, p.156] or the principle of acceptance due to Harsanyi [10, p.52],
the partial comparability approach developed by Sen [21] and Fine [7], and some plausible
9See also a recent work by Gravel [9] which shows how restrictive is the class of economies which are
free from this logical diﬃculty of the Samuelson compensation principle.
45quasi-orderings introduced by Blackorby and Donaldson [4] immediately suggest them-
selves.10 One may be led to think that an embarrassment of riches is a real possibility
here, but a crucial problem still remains.11 All these proposed quasi-orderings are based
on interpersonal welfare comparisons in one form or the other. In this sense, they are
not in fact in harmony with the informational basis of the new welfare economics.
It seems to us that deﬁning the Pareto-inclusive test relations which can pass the
crucial test of consistency without requiring anything beyond the informational basis
characterised by ordinalism and interpersonal non-comparability is by no means an easy
task.12 This observation should not surprise anybody, however, as “nothing of much
interest can be said on justice without bringing in some interpersonal comparability (Sen
[20, p.150].”
10See also Madden [15].
11It should also be added that the recoverability of the Bergsonian social choice in terms of the
maximisation of the Pareto-inclusive quasi-orderings does not hold in general.
12In the same spirit, one referee pose an interesting question, which reads as follows: “it could be
of interest to look at whether there are any criteria which utilise information similar to that used by
compensation criteria (information about positions being compared and situations that can be reached
through redistribution) that are both anonymous and satisfy the Pareto criterion. A negative answer
would put the ﬁnal nail into the new welfare economics approach.” This chapter stops short of putting
the ﬁnal nail into the new welfare economics, but this suggestion is surely interesting to explore.
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48Chapter 12
Arrovian Aggregation in Economic
Environments: How Much Should We
Know about Indiﬀerence Surfaces?¤
1 Introduction
From Arrow’s celebrated theorem of social choice, it is well known that the aggregation
of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the social ranking of any
pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair (this is the
famous axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives). Or, more precisely, it cannot
do so without trespassing basic requirements of unanimity (the Pareto principle) and
anonymity (even in the very weak version of non-dictatorship). This raises the following
question: What additional information about preferences would be needed in order to
make aggregation of preferences possible, and compatible with the basic requirements of
unanimity and anonymity?
In the last decades, the literature on social choice has explored several paths and gave
interesting answers to this question. The main avenue of research has been, after Sen [18]
and d’Aspremont and Gevers [7], the introduction of information about utilities, and it
has been shown that the classical social welfare functions, and less classical ones, could
be obtained with the Arrovian axiomatic method by letting the social preferences take
account of speciﬁc kinds of utility information with interpersonal comparability.
In this chapter, we focus on the introduction of additional information about prefer-
ences that is not of the utility sort. In other words, we retain a framework with purely
¤First published in Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.124, 2005, pp.22-44 as a joint paper with M.
Fleurbaey and K. Tadenuma. We thank A. Leroux for a stimulating discussion, A. Trannoy and anony-
mous referees of Journal of Economic Theory for helpful comments, and participants at seminars in
Cergy, Rochester, Waseda and Hitotsubashi, and the 5th International Meeting of the Society for Social
Choice and Welfare in Alicante. Financial supports from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology of Japan through Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc Research No.10045010 (“Economic
Institutions and Social Norms: Evolution and Transformation”) and the 21st Century Center of Excel-
lence Project on the Normative Evaluation and Social Choice of Contemporary Economic Systems are
gratefully acknowledged.
49ordinal and interpersonally non-comparable preferences. The kind of additional informa-
tion that we study is about the shapes of indiﬀerence surfaces, and we ask how much
one needs to know about indiﬀerence surfaces so as to be able to aggregate individual
preferences while respecting the unanimity and anonymity requirements. The introduc-
tion of this additional information is formulated in terms of weakening Arrow’s axiom of
independence of irrelevant alternatives.
The model adopted here is an economic model, namely, the canonical model of division
of inﬁnitely divisible commodities among a ﬁnite set of agents. We choose to study
an economic model rather than the abstract model that is now commonly used in the
theory of social choice1 for two reasons. First, it allows a more ﬁne-grained analysis of
information about preferences, because it makes it sensible to talk about marginal rates of
substitution and other local notions about indiﬀerence surfaces. Second, in an economic
model preferences are naturally restricted, and by considering a restricted domain we can
hope to obtain positive results with less information than under unrestricted domain.
Our ﬁrst extension of informational basis is to take account of marginal rates of
substitution. It turns out that such inﬁnitesimally local information would not be enough
to escape from dictatorship, and we establish an extension of Arrow’s theorem. Then, it
is natural to take account of the portions of indiﬀerence surfaces in some ﬁnitely sized
neighborhoods of the allocations. Based on this additional information, we can construct
a non-dictatorial aggregation rule or social ordering function, SOF for short, but still
anonymity cannot be attained.
The second direction of extending informational basis focuses on indiﬀerence surfaces
within the corresponding “Edgeworth box”. More precisely, for any two allocations, we
deﬁne the smallest vector of total resources that makes both allocations feasible, and
take the portion of the indiﬀerence surface through each allocation in the region below
the vector. The introduction of this kind of information, however, does not help us avoid
dictatorship.
The third avenue relies on some ﬁxed monotone path from the origin in the consump-
tion space, and focuses on the points of indiﬀerence surfaces that belong to this path.
The idea of referring to such a monotone path is due to Pazner and Schmeidler [16], and
may be justiﬁed if the path contains relevant benchmark bundles. Making use of this
additional information, and following Pazner and Schmeidler’s [16] contribution, we can
construct a Paretian and anonymous SOF.
Our ﬁnal, the largest, extension of informational basis is to take whole indiﬀerence
surfaces. Given the above result, a Paretian and anonymous SOF can be constructed on
this informational basis.
The motivation for our research builds on many works in recent and less recent liter-
ature. Attempts to construct SOFs and similar objects embodying unanimity and equity
requirements were made by Suzumura [19, 20] and Tadenuma [21]. The idea that infor-
mation about whole indiﬀerence surfaces is suﬃcient, hinted at by Pazner and Schmei-
dler [16] and Maniquet [14], was made more precise in Pazner [15] and was revived by
1Recollect, however, that Arrow’s initial presentations [1; 2] dealt with this economic model of division
of commodities.
50Bossert, Fleurbaey and Van de gaer [4] and Fleurbaey and Maniquet [8, 9] who were able
to construct nicely behaved SOFs on this basis. Campbell and Kelly [5] recently studied
essentially the same issue in an abstract model of social choice, and showed that limited
information about preferences may be enough. However, their model does not have the
rich structure of economic environments, and they focus only on non-dictatorship and do
not study how much information is needed for the stronger requirement of anonymity.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework and the main
notions. Sections 3-5 consider the four types of extensions of the informational basis of
social orderings, and present the results. Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains
some proofs.
2 Basic Deﬁnitions and Arrow’s Theorem
The population is ﬁxed. Let N := f1;:::;ng be the set of agents where 2 · n < 1: There
are ` goods indexed by k = 1;:::;` where 2 · ` < 1: Agent i’s consumption bundle is a
vector xi := (xi1;:::;xi`): An allocation is denoted x := (x1;:::;xn): The set of allocations
is Rn`
+ : The set of allocations such that no individual bundle xi is equal to the zero vector
is denoted X. Vector inequalities are denoted as usual: ¸;>; and À.
A preordering is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation. Agent i’s preferences are
described by a complete preordering Ri (strict preference Pi; indiﬀerence Ii) on R`
+: A
proﬁle of preferences is denoted R := (R1;:::;Rn): Let R be the set of continuous, convex,
and strictly monotonic preferences over R`
+.
A SOF is a mapping ¯ R deﬁned on Rn such that, for all R 2 Rn; ¯ R(R) is a com-
plete preordering on the set of allocations Rn`
+ : Let ¯ P(R) (resp. ¯ I(R)) denote the strict
preference (resp. indiﬀerence) relation associated to ¯ R(R).
Let ¼ be a bijection on N: For each x 2 Rn`
+ ; deﬁne ¼(x) := (x¼(1);:::;x¼(n)) 2 Rn`
+ ,
and for each R 2 Rn; deﬁne ¼(R) := (R¼(1);:::;R¼(n)) 2 Rn. Let ¦ be the set of all
bijections on N. The basic requirements of unanimity and anonymity on which we focus
in this chapter are the following.
Weak Pareto: 8R 2 Rn; 8x;y 2 Rn`
+ ; if 8i 2 N;xiPiyi; then x ¯ P(R)y:
Anonymity: 8R 2 Rn;8x;y 2 Rn`
+ ;8¼ 2 ¦ :
x ¯ R(R)y , ¼(x) ¯ R(¼(R)) ¼(y):
Concerning the non-dictatorship form of anonymity, we only deﬁne here what dicta-
torship means, for convenience. Notice that it has to do only with allocations in X; that
is, without the zero bundle for any agent.
Dictatorial SOF: A SOF ¯ R is dictatorial if there exists i0 2 N such that:
8R 2 R
n;8x;y 2 X : xi0Pi0yi0 ) x ¯ P(R)y:
51The traditional, Arrovian, version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is:
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): 8R;R0 2 Rn; 8x;y 2 Rn`
+ ; if 8i 2
N, Ri and R0
i agree on fxi;yig, then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R0) agree on fx;yg:
IIA requires that the social ranking of any pair of allocations depends only on agents’
binary preferences over that pair. Hence, the informational basis of construction of social
orderings is very restricted.
The version of Arrow’s theorem for the present canonical model of division of com-
modities is due to Bordes and Le Breton [3].
Proposition 1 (Bordes and Le Breton [3]) If a SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA,
then it is dictatorial.
3 Local Extension of Informational Basis
The IIA axiom can be weakened by strengthening the premise: that is, for any two pref-
erence proﬁles and any pair of allocations, only when some properties about indiﬀerence
surfaces associated with the two allocations coincide in addition to pairwise preferences,
it is required that the social ranking over the two allocations should agree. This amounts
to allowing the SOF to make use of more information about indiﬀerence surfaces when
ranking each pair of allocations.
In this chapter, we consider four types of extensions of the informational basis of social
orderings. First, we use information about marginal rates of substitution. Economists
are used to focus on marginal rates of substitution when assessing the eﬃciency of an
allocation, especially under convexity, since for convex preferences the marginal rates of
substitution determine the half space in which the upper contour set lies. Moreover,
for eﬃcient allocations, the shadow prices enable one to compute the relative implicit
income shares of diﬀerent agents, thereby potentially providing a relevant measure of
inequalities in the distribution of resources. Therefore, taking account of marginal rates of
substitution is a natural extension of the informational basis of social choice in economic
environments.
Let C(xi;Ri) denote the cone of price vectors that support the upper contour set for
Ri at xi :
C(xi;Ri) := fp 2 R
`j8y 2 R
`
+;py = pxi ) xiRiyg:
When preferences Ri are strictly monotonic, one has C(xi;Ri) ½ R`
++ whenever xi À 0.
IIA except Marginal Rates of Substitution (IIA-MRS): 8R;R0 2 Rn; 8x;y 2 Rn`
+ ;
if 8i 2 N, Ri and R0







52then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R0) agree on fx;yg.
It is clear that IIA implies IIA-MRS. The converse does not hold as an example in
Appendix A.4 shows. It turns out, unfortunately, that weakening IIA into IIA-MRS
cannot alter the dictatorship conclusion of Arrow’s theorem. Introducing information
about marginal rates of substitution, in addition to pairwise preferences, does not make
room for satisfactory SOFs.
Proposition 2 If a SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA-MRS, then it is dictatorial.
The proof of Proposition 2 is long and is relegated to the appendix, but here we sketch
the main line of the proof. Since IIA implies IIA-MRS, Proposition 2 is a generalization
of the theorem by Bordes and Le Breton [3, Theorem 3]. An essential idea of the proofs
of Arrow-like theorems in economic environments (Kalai, Muller and Satterthwaite [13],
Bordes and Le Breton [3], and others) is as follows: First, we ﬁnd a “free triple”, that
is, three allocations for which any ranking is possible in each individual’s preferences
satisfying the standard assumptions in economics. By applying Arrow’s theorem for
these three allocations, it can be shown that there exists a “local dictator” for each free
triple. Then, we “connect” free triples in a suitable way to show that these local dictators
must be the same individual.
Turning to IIA-MRS, notice ﬁrst that for each free triple, IIA-MRS works just as IIA
only in the class of preference proﬁles for which individuals’ marginal rates of substitution
at the three allocations do not change from one proﬁle to another, and satisfy certain
“supporting conditions”. Invoking Arrow’s theorem, we can only show that there exists
a “local dictator” for each free triple in this much restricted class of preference proﬁles
(Lemmas A.1 and A.2). The diﬃculty in the proof of Proposition 2 lies in extending
“local dictatorship” over the class of all preference proﬁles. This requires much work to
do. See Lemmas A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix.
Inada [12] also considered marginal rates of substitution in an IIA-like axiom, but the
diﬀerence from our work is that he looked for a local aggregator of preferences, namely a
mapping deﬁning a social marginal rate of substitution between goods and individuals,
on the basis of individual marginal rates of substitution. Hence, Inada requires that,
for each allocation, social preferences in an inﬁnitely small neighborhood of the allocation
should not change whenever every agent’s marginal rates of substitution at the allocation
remain the same. By contrast, our IIA-MRS requires that, for each pair of allocations,
social preferences over that pair should not change whenever every agent’s marginal rates
of substitution at each of the two allocations remain the same. There is no logical relation
between Inada’s axiom and ours.
Marginal rates of substitution give an inﬁnitesimally local piece of information about
indiﬀerence surfaces at given allocations. A natural extension of the informational basis
would be to take account of the indiﬀerence surfaces in some ﬁnitely sized neighborhoods
of the two allocations. Deﬁne, for any given real number " > 0;




jxik ¡ vkj · "g:
53Deﬁne
I(xi;Ri) := fz 2 R
`
+ j z Ii xig:
The set I(xi;Ri) is called the indiﬀerence surface at xi for Ri.
The next axiom is deﬁned for any given " > 0.
IIA except Indiﬀerence Surfaces in "-Neighborhoods (IIA-IS"N): 8R;R0 2 Rn;
8x;y 2 Rn`
+ ; if 8i 2 N, Ri and R0
i agree on fxi;yig, and
I(xi;Ri) \ B"(xi) = I(xi;R
0
i) \ B"(xi);
I(yi;Ri) \ B"(yi) = I(yi;R
0
i) \ B"(yi);
then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R0) agree on fx;yg.
It is clear that for any given " > 0, IIA-MRS implies IIA-IS"N. Notice also that the
larger is the value of ", the weaker the condition IIA-IS"N becomes.
The next proposition shows that as soon as one switches from IIA-MRS to IIA-IS"N,
the dictatorship result is avoided even if " is arbitrarily small. However, it remains
impossible to achieve Anonymity even for an arbitrarily large ".
Proposition 3 For any given " > 0, there exists a SOF that satisﬁes Weak Pareto,
IIA-IS"N, and is not dictatorial. However, for any given " > 0, there exists no SOF that
satisﬁes Weak Pareto, IIA-IS"N and Anonymity.
Proof. The proof of the impossibility part is in the appendix. Here we prove the pos-
sibility part. Deﬁne ¯ R as follows: x ¯ R(R)y if either x1R1y1 and [I(x1;R1) * B"(0) or
I(y1;R1) * B"(0)], or x2R2y2 and [I(x1;R1) µ B"(0) and I(y1;R1) µ B"(0)]. For brevity,
let ¡(v) denote [I(v;R1) µ B"(0)]. Weak Pareto and the absence of dictator are straight-
forwardly satisﬁed. IIA-IS"N is also satisﬁed because when ¡(x1) and ¡(y1) hold, we
have B"(0) µ B"(x1) \ B"(y1), and therefore ¡(x1) and ¡(y1) remain true if the indif-
ference surfaces are kept ﬁxed on B"(x1) and B"(y1): It remains to check transitivity
of ¯ R(R): First, note the following property: If ¡(v) holds and vR1v0; then ¡(v0) also
holds. Assume that there exist x;y;z 2 Rn`
+ such that x ¯ R(R)y ¯ R(R)z ¯ P(R)x: If ¡(x1),
¡(y1) and ¡(z1) all hold, this is impossible because one should have x2R2y2R2z2P2x2: If
only one of the three conditions ¡(x1), ¡(y1), ¡(z1) is satisﬁed, it is similarly impossible
because one should have x1R1y1R1z1P1x1: Assume ¡(x1) and ¡(y1) hold, but not ¡(z1):
Then, y ¯ R(R)z ¯ P(R)x requires y1R1z1P1x1; which implies ¡(z1); a contradiction. Assume
¡(x1) and ¡(z1) hold, but not ¡(y1). Then, x ¯ R(R)y ¯ R(R)z requires x1R1y1R1z1; which
implies ¡(y1); a contradiction. Assume ¡(y1) and ¡(z1) hold, but not ¡(x1): Then,
z ¯ P(R)x ¯ R(R)y requires z1P1x1R1y1; which implies ¡(x1); a contradiction.
4 Extension of Informational Basis to “Edgeworth
Boxes”
Our second type of extension of informational basis is to focus on the portions of indiﬀer-
ence surfaces, associated with each pair of allocations, that lie within the corresponding
54“Edgeworth box”: namely, the set of bundles that are achievable by redistributing the
two allocations under consideration. However, for a given pair of allocations, the two
allocations may need diﬀerent amounts of total resources to be feasible. Therefore we
need to introduce the following notions. For each good k 2 f1;:::;`g; deﬁne







Let !(x;y) := (!1(x;y);:::;!`(x;y)): The vector !(x;y) 2 R`
+ represents the smallest
amount of total resources that makes two allocations x and y feasible. Fig. 1 illustrates





+ j z · !(x;y)
ª
:
The set Ω(x;y) ½ R`
+ is the set of consumption bundles that are feasible with !(x;y): The
following axiom captures the idea that the ranking of any two allocations should depend
only on the indiﬀerence surfaces over the region satisfying the corresponding feasibility
constraint.
IIA except Indiﬀerence Surfaces over Feasible Allocations (IIA-ISFA): 8R;R0 2
Rn; 8x;y 2 Rn`
+ ; if 8i 2 N,
I(xi;Ri) \ Ω(x;y) = I(xi;R
0
i) \ Ω(x;y);
I(yi;Ri) \ Ω(x;y) = I(yi;R
0
i) \ Ω(x;y);




























ry1 + y2 r!(x;y)
- ¾ "
Figure 1: Relevant Portions of Indiﬀerence Surfaces under IIA-ISFA and IIA-IS"N
55The left ﬁgure in Figure 1 illustrates the relevant portions of indiﬀerence surfaces
under IIA-ISFA, which are indicated by thick curves, while the right ﬁgure shows the
relevant parts under IIA-IS"N. One can see that, in general, there is no inclusion relation
between the relevant portions of indiﬀerence surfaces under IIA-ISFA and those under
IIA-IS"N. Hence, there is no logical relation between the axioms IIA-ISFA and IIA-IS"N.
See counterexamples in Appendix A.4.
The introduction of information about indiﬀerence surfaces over the region satisfying
the corresponding feasibility constraint, however, cannot help us avoid a dictatorial SOF.
Proposition 4 If a SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA-ISFA, then it is dictatorial.
The proof relies on the following lemmas. First, we deﬁne a weak form of IIA:
Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (WIIA): 8R;R0 2 Rn; 8x;y 2 X;
if 8i 2 N, Ri and R0
i agree on fxi;yig; and for no i; xi Ii yi, then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R0) agree
on fx;yg:
A key lemma to prove Proposition 4 is the following:
Lemma 1 If a SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA-ISFA, then it satisﬁes WIIA.
The proof of this lemma is long and relegated in the appendix. We also deﬁne a weak
form of dictatorship: Given a SOF ¯ R, Y µ X and R0 µ Rn, we say that agent i0 2 N is
a quasi-dictator for ¯ R over (Y;R0) if for all x;y 2 Y , and all R 2 R0, whenever xi0Pi0yi0
and there is no i 2 N with xiIiyi, we have x ¯ P(R)y.
Quasi-Dictatorial SOF: A SOF ¯ R is quasi-dictatorial if there exists a quasi-dictator
i0 2 N for ¯ R over (X;Rn).
Lemma 2 If a SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto and WIIA, then it is quasi-dictatorial.
Proof. Let ¯ R be a SOF that satisﬁes Weak Pareto and WIIA. By an adaptation of a
standard proof of Arrow’s theorem (for instance, Sen [18]), we can show that for every
free triple Y ½ X, there exists a quasi-dictator over (Y;Rn). Then, a direct application
of Bordes and Le Breton [3] establishes quasi-dictatorship of ¯ R.
It is interesting that, in our economic environments, quasi-dictatorship is equivalent
to dictatorship as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 3 If a SOF ¯ R is quasi-dictatorial, then it is dictatorial.
Proof. Let ¯ R be a quasi-dictatorial SOF. Let x;y 2 X and R 2 Rn be such that
xi0Pi0yi0: By continuity and strict monotonicity of preferences, there exists x0 2 X such
that xi0Pi0x0
i0Pi0yi0 and for all i 2 N; either xiPix0
iPiyi or yiRixiPix0
i: Since ¯ R is quasi-
dictatorial, it follows that x ¯ P(R)x0 and x0 ¯ P(R)y. By transitivity, x ¯ P(R)y:
56Given these lemmas, the proof of Proposition 4 is straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let ¯ R be a SOF that satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIA-ISFA. By
Lemma 1, ¯ R satisﬁes WIIA. Then, by Lemmas 2 and 3, ¯ R is dictatorial.
One may deﬁne a weaker axiom than IIA-ISFA by considering a radial expansion of
the corresponding “Edgeworth box”, namely ¸Ω(x;y) for a given ¸ ¸ 1, where ¸ can
be arbitrarily large. With this version, however, the same impossibility still holds as
Proposition 4.
5 Extension of Informational Basis with a Monotone
Path
The previous sections have shown that non-local information about indiﬀerence surfaces
is needed to construct a satisfactory SOF. This does not mean, however, that a lot of
information is needed. In this section we show that knowing one point in each indiﬀerence
surface may be enough.
Our third way of extending information about indiﬀerence surfaces is to rely on a
path
¤!0 := f¸!0 2 R
`
++ j ¸ 2 R+g;
where !0 2 R`
++ is ﬁxed, and to focus on the point of each indiﬀerence surface that
belongs to this path. The idea of referring to such a path is due to Pazner and Schmeidler
[16], and may be justiﬁed if the path contains relevant benchmark bundles. Although
the choice of !0 is not discussed here, it need not be arbitrary. For instance, one may
imagine that it could reﬂect an appropriate equity notion, or it could be the bundle of
the total available resources.
IIA except Indiﬀerence Surfaces on Path !0 (IIA-ISP!0): 8R;R0 2 Rn, 8x;y 2
Rn`
+ , if 8i 2 N,
I(xi;Ri) \ ¤!0 = I(xi;R
0
i) \ ¤!0;
I(yi;Ri) \ ¤!0 = I(yi;R
0
i) \ ¤!0;
then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R0) agree on fx;yg.
Following Pazner and Schmeidler’s [16] contribution, we can derive the next result,
which means that not much information is needed to have an anonymous SOF if only we
are prepared to accept an externally speciﬁed reference bundle.
Proposition 5 For any given !0 2 R`
++, there exists a SOF that satisﬁes Weak Pareto,
IIA-ISP!0 and Anonymity.
57Proof. For each i 2 N, each Ri 2 R and each xi 2 R`
+, let ®(xi;Ri) 2 R+ be the scalar
such that ®(xi;Ri)!0Iixi. By continuity and strict monotonicity of preferences, ®(xi;Ri)
always exists uniquely. Let ¯ R be deﬁned by:





This SOF clearly satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Anonymity. It also satisﬁes IIA-ISP!0 be-
cause whenever I(xi;Ri) \ ¤!0 = I(xi;R0
i) \ ¤!0; we have ®(xi;Ri) = ®(xi;R0
i).
By relying on the leximin criterion rather than the maximin for the SOF deﬁned in the
above proof, we could have the Strong Pareto property as well: 8x;y 2 Rn`
+ ;8R 2 Rn
if 8i 2 N; xiRiyi, then x ¯ R(R)y and if, in addition, 9i 2 N; xiPiyi; then x ¯ P(R)y:
The ﬁnal extension of informational basis that we consider is to introduce whole
indiﬀerence surfaces. This condition was already introduced and studied by Hansson [11]
in the abstract model of social choice, who showed that the Borda rule, which does not
satisfy the Arrow IIA condition, satisﬁes this constrained variant thereof. Pazner [15]
also proposed it, in a study of social choice in economic environments.









then ¯ R(R) and ¯ R(R0) agree on fx;yg.
Since IIA-ISP!0 (as well as every other IIA type axiom introduced so far) implies
IIA-WIS, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 There exists a SOF that satisﬁes Weak Pareto, IIA-WIS and Anonymity.
There are many examples of SOFs satisfying Weak Pareto, IIA-WIS and Anonymity.
Thus, in addition to these three axioms, we may add other requirements embodying
various equity principles. Notice that Strong Pareto and Anonymity already entail a
version of the Suppes grading principle: for all R 2 Rn; all x;y; if there are i;j such
that Ri = Rj; xiPiyj and xjPiyi; and for h 6= i;j; xh = yh; then x ¯ P(R)y: We can also
construct SOFs satisfying Strong Pareto, IIA-WIS (or IIA-ISP!0), Anonymity and the
following version of the Hammond equity axiom (Hammond [10]): for all R 2 Rn; and
all x;y 2 Rn`
+ ; if there are i;j such that Ri = Rj; yiPixiPixjPiyj; and for all h 6= i;j;
xh = yh; then x ¯ P(R)y:
Let us summarize in Figure 2 the various IIA type axioms that we have introduced,
and the main results in this chapter. The arrows indicate logical relations between the
axioms. Weaker axioms allow SOFs to depend on more information about indiﬀerence
surfaces. In the appendix we show that all the implications are strict (the converse rela-
tions do not hold). The dotted lines in the ﬁgure indicate borderlines between possibility
and impossibility, under Weak Pareto, of Non-Dictatorship and of Anonymity.
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Figure 2: Various IIA Axioms and Summary of the Main Results
6 Conclusion
The construction of a non-dictatorial Arrovian SOF in a framework with purely ordinal,
interpersonally non-comparable preferences requires information about the shape of in-
diﬀerence surfaces that goes well beyond inﬁnitesimally local data such as marginal rates
of substitution or data within the corresponding “Edgeworth box”. On the basis of in-
formation in some ﬁnitely sized neighborhoods, one can construct a non-dictatorial SOF,
but still cannot have an anonymous one. Only substantially non-local information about
indiﬀerence surfaces enables one to construct a Paretian and anonymous SOF. These
are the main messages of this chapter, in which we proved two extensions of Arrow’s
impossibility theorem, and several possibility results. We hope that this chapter, more
broadly, contributes to clarifying the informational foundations in the theory of social
choice.
There are limits to our work which may be noticed here, and call for further research.
First, we study a particular economic model, and it would be worth analyzing the same
issues in other models such as the standard abstract model of social choice or other
economic models, in particular models with public goods (the case of consumption ex-
ternalities in our model could also be subsumed under the case of public goods). Second,
the information about indiﬀerence surfaces is a complex set of objects, and our analysis
is far from being exhaustive on the pieces of data which can be extracted from this set.
We have focussed on what seemed to us the most natural parts of indiﬀerence surfaces
to which one may want to refer in social evaluation of allocations, namely, the marginal
rates of substitution, the Edgeworth box (bundles which are achievable by redistributing
the considered allocations), and reference rays. But there may be other ways of consider-
ing indiﬀerence surfaces. For instance, it would be nice to have a measure of the degree
to which a given piece of information is local, and the connection between this work
59and topological social choice (e.g. Chichilnisky [6]) might be worth exploring. Third,
there may be other kinds of interesting additional information. For instance, Roberts
[17] considered introducing information about utilities and about non-local preferences
at the same time, and was able to characterize the Nash social welfare function on this
basis. There certainly are many avenues of research along these lines. The purpose of
this chapter would be well-served if it could open the gate towards these enticing avenues.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 relies on the following lemmas.




+ ;(yi;y¡i) 2 Y g. Let Q denote the set of convex cones in R`
++: For each
yi 2 Yi, let Q(yi) 2 Q be given. We say that the set Yi satisﬁes the supporting condition
with respect to fQ(yi)jyi 2 Yig if for all yi 2 Yi, all q 2 Q(yi), and all y0
i 2 Yi with y0
i 6= yi,
q ¢ yi < q ¢ y0
i. Deﬁne
R(Yi;fQ(yi) j yi 2 Yig) := fRi 2 R j 8yi 2 Yi;C(yi;Ri) = Q(yi)g:
The set of all complete preorderings on Yi is denoted by O(Yi). For all Ri 2 R; RijYi
denotes the restriction of Ri on Yi. Namely, RijYi is the complete preordering on Yi such
that for all xi;yi 2 Yi; xi RijYi yi , xi Ri yi. For all R0½ R; let R0jYi := fRijYi j Ri 2 R0g:
For all xi 2 X and all Ri 2 R; let U(xi;Ri) := fx0
i 2 X j x0
i Ri xig denote the (closed)
upper contour set of xi for Ri:
Lemma A.1 If a ﬁnite set Yi ½ R`
+ satisﬁes the supporting condition with respect to
fQ(yi)jyi 2 Yig, then R(Yi;fQ(yi)jyi 2 Yig)jYi = O(Yi).
Proof. We have only to show that O(Yi) µ R(Yi;fQ(yi)jyi 2 Yig)jYi: Let R0 2 O(Yi)
be any preordering on Yi: Construct a complete preordering Ri 2 R so that the upper
contour set of each yi 2 Yi is deﬁned as follows. Let xi 2 Yi be such that for all yi 2
Yi, yiR0
ixi. Deﬁne Y 1
i := fyi 2 YijyiI0
ixig: For each a 2 R`
+ and each q 2 R`
++, deﬁne
H(a;q) := fb 2 R`












Let I(xi;Ri) be the boundary of U(xi;Ri): Clearly, for all yi 2 Y 1
i ; C(yi;Ri) = Q(yi):
We also have that, for all yi 2 YinY 1
i ; and for all x0
i 2 I(xi;Ri); yiPix0
i: Given ± > 0; let
(1 + ±)U(xi;Ri) := fx0
i 2 R`
+j9ai 2 U(xi;Ri);x0
i = (1 + ±)aig; and let (1 + ±)I(xi;Ri) be
the boundary of (1+±)U(xi;Ri): For suﬃciently small ±; we have that for all yi 2 YinY 1
i
60and all x0
i 2 (1 + ±)I(xi;Ri), yiPix0
i by continuity of preferences. Let zi 2 YinY 1
i be such
that for all yi 2 YinY 1
i , yiR0
izi. Deﬁne Y 2
i := fyi 2 YinY 1
i jyiI0
izig: Let
















Let I(zi;Ri) be the boundary of U(zi;Ri): By deﬁnition, for all yi 2 Y 2
i , C(yi;Ri) = Q(yi):
We have that, for all yi 2 Yin(Y 1
i [ Y 2
i ) and all x0
i 2 I(zi;Ri); yiPix0
i: Similarly we
can construct the upper contour set of each yi 2 Yin(Y 1
i [ Y 2
i ): By its construction,
Ri 2 R(Yi;fQ(yi)jyi 2 Yig) and RijYi = R0: Thus, R0 2 R(Yi;fQ(yi)jyi 2 Yig)jYi:
Let ¯ R be a SOF. Let Y µ X and R0 µ Rn be given. We say that agent i0 2 N is
a local dictator for ¯ R over (Y;R0) if, for all x;y 2 Y and all R 2 R0, xi0Pi0yi0 implies
x ¯ P(R)y.
Given a set A, let jAj denote the cardinality of A.
Lemma A.2 Let ¯ R be a SOF satisfying Weak Pareto and IIA-MRS. Let Y ½ X be a
ﬁnite subset of X such that jY j ¸ 3. Suppose that for all i 2 N, Yi satisﬁes the supporting
condition with respect to fQ(yi)jyi 2 Yig. Then, there exists a local dictator i0 2 N for
¯ R over (Y;
Q
i2N R(Yi;fQ(yi)jyi 2 Yig)).
Proof. For all R;R0 2
Q
i2N R(Yi;fQ(yi)jyi 2 Yig); all y 2 Y; and all i 2 N; C(yi;Ri) =
C(yi;R0
i): Since ¯ R satisﬁes IIA-MRS, we have that, for all x;y 2 Y; and all R;R0 2 Q
i2N R(Yi;fQ(yi)j yi 2 Yig); if Ri and R0
i agree on fxi;yig for all i 2 N, then ¯ R(R) and
¯ R(R0) agree on fx;yg: By Lemma A.1, for all i 2 N;R(Yi;fQ(yi)jyi 2 Yig)jYi = O(Yi):




We say that a subset Y of X is free for agent i if RjYi = O(Yi): It is free if it is free
for all i 2 N: If Y contains two elements, it is a free pair. If Y contains three elements,
it is a free triple. Note that a set fx;yg is a free pair for i 2 N if and only if, for some
k;k0 2 f1;:::;`g, xik > yik and yik0 > xik0. Given two consumption bundles xi;yi 2 R`
+,
deﬁne xi ^ yi 2 R`
+ as (xi ^ yi)k = minfxik;yikg for all k 2 f1;:::;`g.
Lemma A.3 Let ¯ R be a SOF satisfying Weak Pareto and IIA-MRS. If fx;yg ½ X is a
free pair, then there exists a local dictator for ¯ R over (fx;yg;Rn).
Proof. Let ¯ R be a SOF satisfying Weak Pareto and IIA-MRS. Let fx;yg ½ X be a free
pair. Let
K1 := fk 2 f1;:::;`g j xik > yikg
K2 := fk 2 f1;:::;`g j xik < yikg
Since fx;yg is a free pair, K1;K2 6= ;.
61Step 1 : For each i 2 N, we deﬁne two consumption bundles zi;wi 2 X as follows:






(xi ¡ xi ^ yi) +
1
3
(yi ¡ xi ^ yi)
¸
(1)






(xi ¡ xi ^ yi) +
2
3




























Figure 3: Proof of Lemma A.3
Figure 3 illustrates the bundles xi;yi;xi^yi;zi;wi; and also bi;vi;ti; which are deﬁned
in the next step. Let q 2 R`










qk(xik ¡ yik) (3)
Since K1 6= ;, the right-hand-side of (3) can be arbitrarily large as (qk)k2K1 become
large, (qk)k2K2 being constant. Hence, there exists a price vector q(yi) 2 R`
++ that
satisﬁes inequality (3). With some calculations, it can be shown that q(yi)¢yi < q(yi)¢zi
and q(yi) ¢ yi < q(yi) ¢ xi.
Similarly, for each a 2 fxi;zi;wig, we can ﬁnd a price vector q(a) 2 R`
++ such that, for
all a0 2 fxi;zi;wi;yig with a0 6= a, q(a) ¢ a < q(a) ¢ a0. Hence, the set Y 0
i = fxi;zi;wi;yig
satisﬁes the supporting condition with respect to fq(xi);q(zi);q(wi);q(yi)g:2
2With a slight abuse of notation, we write q(¢) for Q(¢) = f®q(¢) j ® > 0g.
62Let z := (zi)i2N and w := (wi)i2N. Let Y 0 := fx;z;w;yg. By Lemma A.2, there




Step 2: We will show that agent i0 is a local dictator for ¯ R over (fx;yg;Rn).
Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists a preference proﬁle R0 2 Rn such that
(i) xi0P 0
i0yi0 and y ¯ R(R0)x or (ii) yi0P 0
i0xi0 and x ¯ R(R0)y. Without loss of generality,








i ;fq(zi);q(wi);q(yi)g)): (Otherwise, by Lemma A.2, there exists a local
dictator j 6= i0 for ¯ R over (Y 1;
Q
i2N R(Y 1
i ;fq(zi);q(wi);q(yi)g)); and we can construct a







q(yi)g) such that zi0Pi0wi0 and wjPjzj: Hence we must have z ¯ P(R)w and w ¯ P(R)z, which
is a contradiction.)
We deﬁne two allocations v;t 2 X in the following steps. Let i 2 N. First, deﬁne
bi 2 R`
+ as follows: If, for all q 2 C(xi;R0
i), q ¢ (yi ¡ xi) ¸ 0, then let bi := yi. If,
for some q 2 C(xi;R0
i), q ¢ (yi ¡ xi) < 0, then let µ > 0 be a positive number such
that, for all q 2 C(xi;R0
i), q ¢ [yi + µ(yi ¡ xi ^ yi) ¡ xi] > 0. Since q 2 R`
++ by strict
monotonicity of preferences, and yi ¡ xi ^ yi > 0, such a number µ exists. Then, deﬁne
bi := yi+µ(yi¡xi^yi). By deﬁnition, bi > yi, and, for all q 2 C(xi;R0
i), q¢(bi¡xi) > 0.
Deﬁne
vi := bi + 2(bi ¡ xi ^ yi):
Then, vi > bi > yi, and, for all q 2 C(xi;R0
i), q ¢ (vi ¡ xi) > 0.
Next, deﬁne






(vi ¡ xi ^ yi) +
1
3




ti = bi +
1
6
(wi ¡ xi ^ yi) > bi
and, for all q 2 C(xi;R0
i), q ¢ xi < q ¢ ti.
As in Step 1, we can ﬁnd price vectors q(vi);q(ti) 2 R`
++ such that q(vi)¢vi < q(vi)¢a
for all a 2 fxi;zi;wi;tig, and q(ti) ¢ ti < q(ti) ¢ a for all a 2 fxi;zi;wi;vig.
On the other hand, because vi > yi and ti > yi, we have that q(zi) ¢ zi < q(zi) ¢ a for
all a 2 fti;vig, and q(wi) ¢ wi < q(wi) ¢ a for all a 2 fti;vig.
So far we have shown that
(i) the set Y 2
i := fxi;ti;vig satisﬁes the supporting condition with respect to fC(xi;R0
i);
q(ti);q(vi)g.
(ii) the set Y 3
i := fzi;wi;ti;vig satisﬁes the supporting condition with respect to fq(zi);
q(wi);q(ti);q(vi)g.
Let v := (vi)i2N and t := (ti)i2N. Let Y 2 := fx;t;vg and Y 3 := fz;w;t;vg. By













q(yi)g)). Let R1 2 Rn be a preference proﬁle such that for all i 2 N, C(xi;R1
i) =
C(xi;R0
i); and for all ai 2 fti;vi;wi;yi;zig, C(ai;R1



































q(wi);q(ti);q(vi)g); this implies that i0 = i2: Hence, we have t ¯ P(R1)v: Since R2 2 Q
i2N R(Y 2
i ;fC(xi;R0
i);q(ti);q(vi)g); it follows that i0 = i1:
Let R2 2 Rn be a preference proﬁle such that xi0P 2







i) = fq(vi)g and C(yi;R2
i)
= C(yi;R0









i);q(ti);q(vi)g), we have that x ¯ P(R2)v. Re-
call that, for all i 2 N, vi > yi. Hence, by strict monotonicity of preferences, viP 2
i yi for
all i 2 N. Because the SOF ¯ R satisﬁes Weak Pareto, we have v ¯ P(R2)y. By transi-





i), and y ¯ R(R0)x, we must have y ¯ R(R2)x. This is a contradiction.
Lemma A.4 Let ¯ R be a SOF satisfying Weak Pareto and IIA-MRS. If fx;y;zg ½ X is
a free triple, then there exists a local dictator for ¯ R over (fx;y;zg;Rn).
Proof. By Lemma A.3, there exist a local dictator i0 over (fx;yg;Rn); a local dictator
i1 over (fy;zg;Rn); and a local dictator i2 over (fx;zg;Rn): Suppose that i0 6= i1: Let
R 2 Rn be a preference proﬁle such that xi0Pi0yi0; yi1Pi1zi1; and zi2Pi2xi2: Then, we have
x ¯ P(R)y ¯ P(R)z ¯ P(R)x; which contradicts the transitivity of ¯ R(R): Hence, we must have
i0 = i1: By the same argument, we have i0 = i1 = i2:
Proof of Proposition 2: Let ¯ R be a SOF satisfying Weak Pareto and IIA-MRS. By
Lemma A.3, for every free pair fx;yg ½ X; there exists a local dictator over (fx;yg;Rn):
By Lemma A.4 and Bordes and Le Breton [3, Theorem 2], these dictators must be the
same individual. Denote this individual by i0: It remains to show that, for any pair fx;yg
that is not free, i0 is the local dictator over (fx;yg;Rn): Suppose, on the contrary, that
there exist fx;yg ½ X and R 2 Rn such that fx;yg is not a free pair, and xi0Pi0yi0 but
y ¯ R(R)x: Deﬁne zi0 2 R`
+ as follows.
Case 1: fx;yg is a free pair for i0:
For all ¸ 2]0;1[; f¸x + (1 ¡ ¸)y;xg and f¸x + (1 ¡ ¸)y;yg are free pairs for i0. By
continuity, there exists ¸¤ such that xi0Pi0[¸¤xi0 + (1 ¡ ¸¤)yi0]Pi0yi0: Then, let zi0 :=
¸¤xi0 + (1 ¡ ¸¤)yi0:
Case 2: fx;yg is not a free pair for i0:
64Then, for all k 2 f1;:::;`g; xi0k ¸ yi0k with at least one strict inequality. Note that
y 6= 0:
Case 2-1: There exists k0 such that for all k 2 f1;:::;`g with k 6= k0; xi0k = yi0k and
yi0k0 > 0:
Then, xi0k0 > yi0k0 > 0: Given " > 0; deﬁne wi0 2 R`
+ as wi0k0 := yi0k0 and, for all
k 6= k0;wi0k := yi0k + ": For suﬃciently small "; we have xi0Pi0wi0Pi0yi0 by continuity
and strict monotonicity of preferences. Given ± > 0; deﬁne ti0 2 R`
+ as ti0k0 := wi0k0 ¡ ±
and, for all k 6= k0;ti0k := wi0k: For suﬃciently small ±; we have xi0Pi0ti0Pi0yi0, again by
continuity and strict monotonicity of preferences. Moreover, ft;xg and ft;yg are free
pairs for i0: Then, let zi0 := ti0:
Case 2-2: There exists k0 such that, for all k 2 f1;:::;`g with k 6= k0; xi0k = yi0k and
yi0k0 = 0:
Then, for all k 2 f1;:::;`g with k 6= k0; xi0k = yi0k > 0: Let k00 6= k0: Given " > 0;
deﬁne wi0 2 R`
+ as wi0k00 := xi0k00 ¡ " and, for all k 6= k00;wi0k := xi0k: For suﬃciently
small "; we have xi0Pi0wi0Pi0yi0: Given ± > 0; deﬁne ti0 2 R`
+ as ti0k0 := wi0k0 +± and, for
all k 6= k0;ti0k := wi0k: For suﬃciently small ±; we have xi0Pi0ti0Pi0yi0: Moreover, ft;xg
and ft;yg are free pairs for i0: Then, let zi0 := ti0:
Case 2-3: There exist k0;k00 2 f1;:::;`g with k0 6= k00; xi0k0 > yi0k0 and xi0k00 > yi0k00:
Let k¤ be such that yi0k¤ > 0: Given " > 0; deﬁne wi0 2 R`
+ as wi0k¤ := yi0k¤ ¡ " and,
for all k 6= k¤;wi0k := xi0k: For suﬃciently small "; we have xi0Pi0wi0Pi0yi0: Let k¤¤ 6= k¤:
Given ± > 0; deﬁne ti0 2 R`
+ as ti0k¤¤ := wi0k¤¤ + ± and, for all k 6= k¤¤;ti0k := wi0k: For
suﬃciently small ±; we have xi0Pi0ti0Pi0yi0: Moreover, ft;xg and ft;yg are free pairs for
i0: Then, let zi0 = ti0:
Next, for each i 6= i0; let zi 2 R`
+ be such that fz;xg and fz;yg are free pairs for i:
By the same construction as above, we can ﬁnd such zi 2 R`
+ for each i: Let z = (zi)i2N
2 Rn`
+ : Since i0 is the dictator over all free pairs, we have that x ¯ P(R)z and z ¯ P(R)y: By
transitivity of ¯ R; we have x ¯ P(R)y; which contradicts the supposition that y ¯ R(R)x. ¥
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
In order to prove the impossibility part, it is convenient to consider various possible
sizes of the population. Let " > 0 be given. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a
SOF ¯ R that satisﬁes Weak Pareto, IIA-IS"N and Anonymity.
Case n = 2: Consider the consumption bundles x := (10";";0;:::); y := (20";";0;:::);
z := (";20";0;:::); w := (";10";0;:::): Deﬁne preference relations R1 2 R and R2 2 R as
follows.
(i) On the subset
S1 := fv 2 R
`
+ j 8i 2 f3;:::;`g;vi = 0 and v2 · minfv1;2"gg
we have
vR1v





and on the subset
S2 := fv 2 R
`
+ j 8i 2 f3;:::;`g;vi = 0 and v1 · minfv2;2"gg;
65we have
vR1v





(ii) On B"(x) [ B"(y),
vR1v













and on B"(z) [ B"(w),
vR1v













(iii) Note that the projection of B"(x) [ B"(y) on the subspace of good 1 and good 2,
namely, [B"(x) [ B"(y)] \ fv 2 R`
+j8i 2 f3;:::;`g;vi = 0g, is included in S1, and the












































Figure 4: Proof of Proposition 3
Since
(w1 + ") + 2(w2 ¡ 2") > x1 + 2x2
and
2(y1 ¡ 2") + (y2 + ") > 2z1 + z2;
66it is possible to complete the deﬁnition of R1 so that wP1x and yP1z: Then, deﬁne R2 so
that it coincides with R1 on S1, on S2, and on B"(a) for all a 2 fx;y;z;wg. Similarly, it
is possible to complete the deﬁnition of R2 so that xP2w and zP2y: Figure 4 illustrates
this construction.
If the proﬁle of preferences is R := (R1;R2); by Weak Pareto we have
(y;x) ¯ P(R)(z;w) and (w;z) ¯ P(R)(x;y):
If the proﬁle of preferences is R0 := (R1;R1); by Anonymity we have
(y;x)¯ I(R
0)(x;y) and (w;z)¯ I(R
0)(z;w):
Since R1 and R2 coincide on B"(a) for all a 2 fx;y;z;wg, it follows from IIA-IS"N that
(y;x)¯ I(R
0)(x;y) , (y;x)¯ I(R)(x;y);
(w;z)¯ I(R
0)(z;w) , (w;z)¯ I(R)(z;w):
By transitivity, (x;y) ¯ P(R)(x;y); which is impossible.
Case n = 3: Consider the consumption bundles x := (10"; 2"
3 ;0;:::); y := (20"; 2"
3 ;0;:::);
t := (15"; 2"
3 ;0;:::); z := (2"
3 ;20";0;:::); w := (2"
3 ;10";0;:::); r := (2"
3 ;15";0;:::): Deﬁne
preference relations R1, R2 and R3 as above on the subset S1, on S2, and on B"(a) for
all a 2 fx;y;z;w;t;rg. Complete their deﬁnitions so that yP1z; wP1x; tP2r; zP2y; xP3w;
and rP3t:
If the proﬁle of preferences is R := (R1;R2;R3); then by Weak Pareto we have
(y;t;x) ¯ P(R)(z;r;w) and (w;z;r) ¯ P(R)(x;y;t):
If the proﬁle of preferences is R0 := (R1;R1;R1); by Anonymity we have
(y;t;x)¯ I(R
0)(x;y;t) and (w;z;r)¯ I(R
0)(z;r;w):
Since R1;R2 and R3 coincide on B"(a) for all a 2 fx;y;t;z;w;rg, it follows from IIA-IS"N
that
(y;t;x)¯ I(R
0)(x;y;t) , (y;t;x)¯ I(R)(x;y;t);
(w;z;r)¯ I(R
0)(z;r;w) , (w;z;r)¯ I(R)(z;r;w):
By transitivity, (x;y;t) ¯ P(R)(x;y;t); which is impossible.
Case n = 2k: Partition the population into k pairs, and construct an argument similar
to the case n = 2; with the consumption bundles x = (10"; 2"
n ;0;:::); y = (20"; 2"
n ;0;:::);
z = (2"
n ;20";0;:::); w = (2"
n ;10";0;:::); and the allocations (y;x;y;x;:::); (x;y;x;y;:::);
(z;w;z;w;:::) and (w;z;w;z;:::):
Case n = 2k + 1: Partition the population into k ¡ 1 pairs and one triple, and
construct an argument combining the cases n = 2 and 3, with the consumption bun-
dles x = (10"; 2"
n ;0;:::); y = (20"; 2"
n ;0;:::); t = (15"; 2"
n ;0;:::); z = (2"
n ;20";0;:::); w =
67(2"
n ;10";0;:::); r = (2"
n ;15";0;:::); and the allocations (y;x;y;x;:::;y;t;x); (x;y;x;y;:::;x;
y;t); (z;w;z;w;:::z;r;w) and (w;z;w;z;:::;w;z;r):
Remark: One may consider a condition which is weaker than both IIA–IS"N and IIA-
ISFA by allowing the social ranking of any two allocations x;y to depend on the portions
of indiﬀerence surfaces in the union of the "-neighborhoods of xi and yi, and the set
Ω(x;y). With this weaker condition, the same impossibility still holds as in Proposition
3. The above proof can be applied without any changes to derive this result.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
To prove Lemma 1, we need an auxiliary lemma. Deﬁne
X1 := fxi 2 R
`
+ n f0g j 8k ¸ 2;xik = 0g
X2 := fxi 2 R
`
+ n f0g j 8k 6= 2;xik = 0g:
Lemma A.5 For all Ri 2 R, and all x;y 2 X, there exists R¤
i 2 R such that
I(xi;Ri) \ Ω(x;y) = I(xi;R
¤
i) \ Ω(x;y)





i) \ X1 6= ;
I(yi;R
¤
i) \ X1 6= ;
Proof. Let Ri 2 R and x;y 2 X be given. Without loss of generality, assume that













where we recall that H(a;q) = fb 2 R`
+ j q ¢ b ¸ q ¢ ag. Let I(xi;R¤
i) be the boundary of
U(xi;R¤
i).
Deﬁne a function g : A ! R+ as follows: For every a 2 A, if (a1 + 1;0;:::;0)Pia,
then let g(a) = 0, and otherwise, let g(a) 2 R be such that (a1+1;g(a)a2;:::;g(a)a`)Iia.
By continuity and strict monotonicity of Ri, g(a) exists uniquely and 0 · g(a) < 1. By
continuity of Ri, g is continuous. For every a 2 A, let b(a) := (a1+1;g(a)a2;:::;g(a)a`).
Deﬁne f : A ! X1 by












Since b(a)Ria, it follows that for every q 2 C(a;Ri), q¢b(a) ¸ q¢a, and so q¢f(a) ¸ q¢a.
Hence, f(a) 2 H(a;q).
68The function f is continuous, and the set A is compact and nonempty. Hence, the
set f(A) is compact and nonempty. Therefore, there exists a¤ 2 A such that jjf(a¤)jj =





. Then, for all a 2 A, and all q 2 C(a;Ri), since
f(a) 2 H(a;q) and f(a¤) ¸ f(a), we have f(a¤) 2 H(a;q). Thus, f(a¤) 2 U(xi;R¤
i),
which proves that U(xi;R¤
i) \ X1 6= ;. By continuity and strict monotonicity of prefer-
ences, I(xi;R¤
i) \ X1 6= ;.























i) be the boundary of ˜ U(yi;R¤
i). Note that I(xi;R¤
i) \ I(yi;R¤
i) = ;. A
similar argument as above shows that U(yi;R¤
i) \ X1 6= ;. Since U(xi;R¤
i) \ X1 6= ;, we
have [(1 + ±)U(xi;R¤
i)] \ X1 6= ;. Thus, ˜ U(yi;R¤
i) \ X1 6= ;. By continuity and strict
monotonicity of preferences, I(yi;R¤
i) \ X1 6= ;.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Let R;R0 2 Rn; x;y 2 X be such that for all i 2 N, Ri and R0
i agree on fxi;yig; and for
no i 2 N; xiIiyi: Assume that x ¯ P(R)y:
By Lemma A.5, there exists R¤ 2 Rn such that for all i 2 N;
I(xi;Ri) \ Ω(x;y) = I(xi;R
¤
i) \ Ω(x;y)





i) \ X1 6= ;
I(yi;R
¤
i) \ X1 6= ;;
and similarly there exists R0¤ 2 Rn such that for all i 2 N;;
I(xi;R
0
i) \ Ω(x;y) = I(xi;R
0¤
i ) \ Ω(x;y)
I(yi;R
0
i) \ Ω(x;y) = I(yi;R
0¤
i ) \ Ω(x;y)
I(xi;R
0¤
i ) \ X2 6= ;
I(yi;R
0¤
i ) \ X2 6= ;:





i ) \ X2 is a singleton. Deﬁne x1;y1 2 Xn
1 by fx1
ig := I(xi;R¤
i) \ X1 and
fy1
ig := I(yi;R¤
i) \ X1 for all i 2 N: Notice that for all i 2 N; x1
i1 > 0; y1
i1 > 0 because
69x;y 2 X and preferences are strictly monotonic. Construct x1¤;y1¤ 2 Xn
1 as follows: for
























































Now, deﬁne x2;y2 2 Xn
2 by fx2
ig := I(xi;R0¤
i )\X2 and fy2
ig := I(yi;R0¤
i )\X2 for all
i 2 N: Again, x2
i2 > 0; y2
i2 > 0 for all i 2 N: Construct x2¤;y2¤ 2 Xn






























































By Weak Pareto, x ¯ P(R0¤)x2¤ and y2¤ ¯ P(R0¤)y:













































Therefore, by IIA-ISFA, x1¤ ¯ P(R¤¤)y1¤: By Weak Pareto, x2¤ ¯ P(R¤¤)x1¤ and y1¤ ¯ P(R¤¤)y2¤;
so that by transitivity, x2¤ ¯ P(R¤¤)y2¤:



































We have proved that x ¯ P(R)y implies x ¯ P(R0)y;. It follows from symmetry of the
argument that y ¯ P(R)x implies y ¯ P(R0)x; and that x¯ I(R)y implies x¯ I(R0)y:
A.4 Logical Relations between the IIA Axioms
1. IIA-MRS implies neither IIA-ISFA nor IIA.
Consider the following SOF: 8R 2 Rn; 8x;y 2 Rn`
+ ; x ¯ R(R) y if and only if
(i) 9p 2 R`
+ such that 8i 2 N, p 2 C(xi;Ri), and 8i;j 2 N, p ¢ xi = p ¢ xj, or
(ii) 6 9p 2 R`
+ such that 8i 2 N, p 2 C(yi;Ri), and 8i;j 2 N, p ¢ yi = p ¢ yj.
This SOF satisﬁes IIA-MRS but violates IIA-ISFA and hence IIA.
2. IIA-IS"N implies neither IIA-ISFA nor IIA.
This is derived from fact 1 above and the fact that IIA-MRS implies IIA-IS"N.
3. IIA-IS"N does not imply IIA-MRS.
This is derived from Propositions 2 and 3.
4. IIA-WIS implies neither IIA-IS"N nor IIA-ISFA.
This is derived from Propositions 3, 4 and Corollary 1.
5. IIA-ISFA implies none of IIA-IS"N, IIA-MRS and IIA.
Fix !0 := (1;:::;1) 2 R`. For each i 2 N, each Ri 2 R and each xi 2 R`
+, let
®(xi;Ri) 2 R+ be deﬁned as in the proof of Proposition 5. Consider the following SOF:
8R 2 Rn; 8x;y 2 Rn`
+ ; x ¯ R(R) y if and only if (i) 6 9¸ 2 R+ such that
P
i2N yi = ¸!0, or
(ii) 9¸;¸0 2 R+ such that
P
i2N xi = ¸!0 and
P
i2N yi = ¸0!0, and mini2N ®(xi;Ri) ¸
mini2N ®(yi;Ri). This SOF satisﬁes IIA-ISFA, but it violates IIA-IS"N and hence IIA-
MRS and IIA.
6. IIA-ISP!0 implies none of IIA-IS"N, IIA-MRS, IIA-ISFA and IIA.
This is derived from Propositions 3-5.
7. IIA-WIS does not imply IIA-ISP!0.
Fix p := (1;:::;1) 2 R`. For each i 2 N, each Ri 2 R and each xi 2 R`
+, deﬁne
e(xi;Ri) := minfp ¢ yijyi 2 I(xi;Ri)g. (That is, e(xi;Ri) is the minimum expenditure to
attain I(xi;Ri) at p.) Consider the following SOF: 8R 2 Rn; 8x;y 2 Rn`
+ ; x ¯ R(R)y if
and only if mini2N e(xi;Ri) ¸ mini2N e(yi;Ri). This SOF satisﬁes IIA-WIS but violates
IIA-ISP!0.
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